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Abstract
In a quantum money scheme, a bank can issue money that users
cannot counterfeit. Similar to bills of paper money, most quantum
money schemes assign a unique serial number to each money state,
thus potentially compromising the privacy of the users of quantum
money. However in a quantum coins scheme, just like the traditional
currency coin scheme, all the money states are exact copies of each
other, providing a better level of privacy for the users.
A quantum money scheme can be private, i.e., only the bank can
verify the money states, or public, meaning anyone can verify. In this
work, we propose a way to lift any private quantum coin scheme – which
is known to exist based on the existence of one-way functions [JLS18]
– to a scheme that closely resembles a public quantum coin scheme.
Verification of a new coin is done by comparing it to the coins the user
already possesses, by using a projector on to the symmetric subspace.
No public coin scheme was known prior to this work. It is also the first
construction that is very close to a public quantum money scheme and
is provably secure based on standard assumptions. The lifting tech-
nique when instantiated with the private quantum coins scheme [MS10]
gives rise to the first construction that is very close to an inefficient
unconditionally secure public quantum money scheme.
1 Introduction
An analogue of the traditional monetary system, quantum money comprises
of quantum money states that are issued by the bank and that are used for
transactions.
A quantum money scheme can be private or public. In the private sce-
nario, only the bank, the entity that issued the money, can verify its au-
thenticity, whereas in the public scenario, the bank generates a public key
that anyone can use to verify the quantum money. While public quantum
money is suitable for use in a setting such as our current cash system, pri-
vate quantum money is applicable in settings such as the purchase of travel
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tickets, wherein we do not expect users to transact with anyone other than
the ticket issuer. The second characterization refers to whether quantum
money users are given “bills” or “coins”. In a coin scheme, all quantum
states are exact copies, and therefore supposed to be indistinguishable from
each other. On the other hand, in a bill scheme, each quantum money state
is unique and is usually associated, in the classical sense, with a distinct
serial number. In both variants, the quantum money scheme overall is said
to be secure if the users cannot counterfeit the quantum money state. The
quantum setting is well suited to prove such unforgeability property due to
the quantum no-cloning theorem [WZ82, Par70, Die82].
The current “gold standard” for detecting counterfeit cash bills is to use
a banknote counter. Equipped with dedicated hardware, banknote counters
can verify the built-in security features (e.g., ultraviolet ink, magnetic ink,
etc.) of a given cash bill. This approach, however, depends on the target
currency and requires tailor made technologies. There is an alternative ap-
proach. Suppose you travel to a foreign country and withdraw some cash
from an ATM. Later you execute a monetary transaction in which you re-
ceive money from an untrusted source. How will you verify the authenticity
of this money? You could compare it to the money you already have in your
wallet (i.e., that you withdrew from the bank’s ATM, and therefore trust).
If it does not look the same, you would not accept it, and you might even
revert the transaction. We call this method comparison-based verification
and we use the money of a foreign country as an example to emphasize the
fact that this approach works even when the specific security features of the
money are not known to the verifier.
In this work, we propose a novel way to lift any quantum private coin
scheme to a scheme which, up to some restrictions, is a public quantum coin
scheme by using an approach inspired from comparison-based verification.
A user can verify a coin that she receives by comparing it to the coins she
already has. In this case, we do not need the bank to run the verification
to receive money, thus rendering the scheme public. Since the comparison
is to money the user already has, it is crucial that the money states of each
denomination be exact copies of each other –, i.e., this approach only works
for private quantum coins and not for private quantum bills. Technically,
in the quantum scenario, the comparison is achieved by testing whether
the new money and the money that we already have are in the symmetric
subspace. The verifier, therefore, must have at least one original coin to
validate the authenticity of new coins. This is similar to the setting given in
the example above, where we compare the money issued to us by a (trusted)
bank to the new money.
In the classical setting, we can test whether two strings are equal. In
the context of money, this is similar to the approach in which we use our
senses to test whether two bills are identical. But in the quantum setting, in
contrast, we cannot test whether two arbitrary quantum states are the same.
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The quantum swap test, which is the same as projecting on to the symmetric
subspace of two registers, is a quantum analog of the classical approach. It
has slightly different properties [BCWdW01]: the swap test accepts quantum
states that are symmetric with respect to the exchange of two registers, with
probability 1. In particular, states of the form |α〉⊗|α〉 always pass the swap
test. A state that is the tensor product of two orthogonal states, such as
|0〉 ⊗ |1〉, is rejected (only) with probability 12 . Classically, these two bits
are clearly not the same, and as such, they would be rejected with certainty,
and we would also like that to happen in the quantum setting. Therefore
we use multiple registers for a single quantum coin, and the verification is
done by projecting on to the symmetric subspace of all the registers of the
new and the old coin. For more details, see the “Proof idea” paragraph on
p. 6.
Coins vs. bills: What difference does it make? A currency bill, un-
like a coin, is marked with a distinct serial number, which can be used to
track the bill and may compromise the users’ privacy. Indeed, one needs to
look no further than the police, whose investigations sometimes use “marked
bills”, a technique that can also be easily exploited by others (e.g., a busi-
nessman may try to learn the identity of its competitor’s customers, etc.).
On the other hand, coins are supposed to be identical copies of each other,
and hence, should be untraceable. Therefore, intuitively coins provide better
privacy than bills. It should be noted that in reality even though coins are
supposed to be identical copies of each other, still there can be attacks to
violate the indistinguishability of coins and therefore violating the privacy
of the users. For example, the attacker might use color ink to mark one
of the coins and later identify the coin using the mark. In our work, we
observe that an analogous attack is also possible for quantum coin scheme
(see Algorithm 5 in Appendix B.2) which is taken care of by imposing some
restrictions on our construction – see Appendix B.1.
Similar notions of privacy have been extensively studied in the clas-
sical setting. For example, Chaum’s ECash [Cha82] provided anonymity
using the notion of blind signatures. The Bitcoin [Nak08] system stores all
the transactions in a public ledger hence making it pseudonymous. Even
though it provides pseudonymity, various studies have shown heuristics and
approaches which can be used to reveal all the different addresses that be-
long to the same person [RS13, RS14, MPJ+16]. The raison d’être of sev-
eral crypto-currencies and protocols, like CoinJoin [Max13], Monero [vS13],
Zcoin [MGGR13], Zcash [BCG+14] and Mimblewimble [Poe16], is to provide
better privacy.
In the quantum setting, quantum bills do not require transactions to be
recorded like the block-chain based classical crypto-currencies and hence bet-
ter in that sense. However, quantum bills rely on serial numbers and thereby
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prone to privacy threats, since these serial numbers could be recorded by
the parties involved in the transactions. Indeed quantum bills do not sat-
isfy the untraceability property for quantum money defined in a recent
work [AMR19] by Alagic et al. In contrast, quantum coins, just like their
classical counterparts, are better for the same reason and might satisfy the
untraceability definition. In terms of one’s privacy, therefore, we view quan-
tum coins as the preferred quantum money format.
From a theoretical perspective, quantum coins can be thought of as
no-cloning on steroids: the no-cloning theorem guarantees that copying a
quantum state is impossible. More formally, given an arbitrary quantum
state |ψ〉, it is impossible to create a two register state |φ〉 such that the states
|φ〉 and |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 have high fidelity. This property provides the motivation
for quantum money, wherein the use of a variant of the no cloning theorem
precludes counterfeiting quantum bills. Yet the “naive” no-cloning theorem
cannot guarantee that, given n copies of the same state, one cannot generate
n+1 copies with high fidelity. In other words, the unforgeability of quantum
bills resembles, or extends results regarding, 1 → 2 optimal cloners while
that of quantum coins requires that one understand the properties of n →
n+ 1 optimal cloners – see [BEM98] and references therein. We stress that
a quantum coin forger does not imply a universal cloner for three main
reasons:1 (a) A coin forger only needs to succeed in cloning the set of coins
generated by the scheme; as its name suggests, a universal cloner guarantees
the fidelity for all quantum states. (b) In the unforgeability experiment, the
forger who receives n coins can try to successfully verify many more states
than it receives, whereas a universal cloner must succeed on exactly n + 1
states. (c) In the adaptive unforgeability experiment, the forger learns the
outcomes of the verifications one by one and can exploit that knowledge.
Related work Quantum money has been studied extensively in inves-
tigations of private bills [Wie83, BBBW83, TOI03, Gav12, GK15], public
bills [Aar09, FGH+12, Zha19], and private coins [MS10, JLS18, AMR19].
The security of the private schemes is generally solid, and some of the
schemes, such as that of Wiesner, are unconditionally secure [MVW12,
PYJ+12]. Mosca and Stebila constructed an inefficient (see Definition 3)
private coin scheme, in which the coin is an n qubit state sampled uniformly
from the Haar measure [MS10]. The recent construction for private coins
by Ji, Liu and Song is based on quantum secure one-way functions [JLS18].
The construction was later simplified in [BS19]. This is arguably one of the
weakest computational assumption possible in quantum cryptography. An-
other recent work by Algaic, Majenz and Russell [AMR19] provides a stateful
construction for private quantum coins by simulating Haar random states.
1In other words, an impossibility result regarding universal n → n + 1 cloning is not
sufficient to prove unforgeability of quantum coins.
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Their construction is unconditionally secure, shares many of the properties
of the work by Mosca and Stebila, while still being efficient. Of course, the
obvious disadvantage is the statefulness of this scheme.
In contrast to the private scenario, public money schemes are much more
complicated to construct, and several such schemes were broken. Aaronson’s
scheme [Aar09] was broken in Ref. [LAF+10]. Aaronson and Christiano’s
scheme [AC13] was broken in Refs. [PFP15, Aar16, BS16, PDF+18] and a fix
using quantum-secure Indistinguishability Obfuscation (IO) was suggested
in [BS16] and proved to be secure in [Zha19]. Unfortunately, various IO
schemes have been broken, and the security of IO is still the focus of extensive
research (see https://malb.io/are-graded-encoding-schemes-broken-yet.
html for more detail). As the authors are not aware of IO schemes that ex-
plicitly claim to be quantum secure, this IO based construction cannot be
instantiated at this point. Another construction by Zhandry [Zha19], called
quantum lightning, is based on a non-standard hardness assumption. Farhi
et al. [FGH+12] constructed a quantum money scheme using elegant tech-
niques from knot theory, but their construction only has a partial security
reduction [Lut11] to a non-standard hardness assumption. Recently, Daniel
Kane [Kan18], proposed a new technique to construct a class of public
quantum money schemes and showed that a general sub-exponential attack
(black-box attack) against such quantum money schemes is not possible.
Further, he argues that instantiating such a technique with modular forms
could yield a secure public money scheme, and provides arguments support-
ing his claim but it still lacks a security proof at this point. To summarize,
even though several public quantum money schemes are known, none of
them have a security proof based on standard hardness assumptions.
Notions of security Informally, a quantum money scheme is unforgeable
if an adversary starting with n money states cannot pass more than n veri-
fications (except with negligible probability). This notion seems too strong
at times. Consider a money scheme where a forger can counterfeit a money
state with probability 12 but only if he risks two of his own money states,
i.e., if he fails then he also loses his two money states. Clearly, even if he
has non-negligible probability of forging, on expectation he actually loses
one money state while trying to forge. Therefore, a rational user would not
try to forge and rather stick to the protocol. Such a scheme will be deemed
forgeable although it is secure in some sense. This leads to the definition
of rational unforgeability (see Definition 8), where we only require that on
expectation any user can have at best negligible advantage due to forging.
Hence, on expectation, the user (submitting the money) cannot have a sig-
nificant gain by deviating from the recommended strategy of the protocol.
Our construction is rational unforgeable – and we argue that this provides
a meaningful notion of security.
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Another line of work is called rational cryptography [GKM+13, ACH11,
PH10, FKN10, KN08, ADGH06, HT04] which discusses protocols consisting
of multiple competing and potentially corrupt parties who might deviate
from the protocol and use different strategies in order to maximize their
gain. It should be noted that our work is different from the notion of rational
cryptography. In the rational cryptography setting, the analysis is about
the equilibrium arising out of the multiple competing parties, whereas here,
the problem is to optimize the strategy of the (single) adversary trying to
maximize his gain against an honest bank. Our work is similar to notion
of rational prover discussed in [MN18]. In [MN18], the authors discuss
quantum delegation in the setting where the verifier also gives a reward to
the prover, the value of which depends on how he cooperated. Hence, the
prover’s goal is to maximize his expected reward rather than cheating the
honest verifier. The authors show that for a particular reward function they
constructed, the optimal strategy for the prover is to cooperate honestly.
Our construction also achieves two more notions of security other than
unforgeability – untraceability (defined in [AMR19]) and security against
sabotage, (similar notion discussed in [BS16]).
Main result Our main contribution is the lifting result, which can lift any
private coin scheme to an almost public coin scheme – see Proposition 13.
By lifting the results in Ref. [JLS18, BS19], we get the following result:
Theorem 1 (Informal Main Result). Assuming one-way functions exist,
there is a public quantum coin scheme which is rationally secure against
forgery against nonadaptive attacks.
Similarly, by lifting the results in Ref. [MS10], we show an inefficient
scheme with the same properties as in Theorem 1 above, which is secure
even against computationally unbounded adversaries. The formal result is
provided in Theorem 11.
Proof idea As discussed above, our construction is an analogical extension
of the classical comparison-based verification. So the first attempt to lift a
private quantum coin scheme is that we give users a private coin |¢〉 as a
public coin, such as the construction by Ji, Liu and Song [JLS18] (later
improved by Brakerski and Shmueli [BS19]). In order to verify a given coin,
the verifier should compare it with a valid coin from his wallet, i.e., perform
symmetric subspace verification on the two registers (the wallet coin and the
new coin). Unfortunately, the scheme that we just described is forgeable.
For example, let’s say an adversary A who does not have a valid coin to
start with, submits a coin |ψ〉 to the verifier. Since the private quantum
scheme is secure, |ψ〉 and |¢〉 would be almost orthogonal, i.e., |ψ〉 ≈ |¢⊥〉
for some |¢⊥〉 in the orthogonal space of |¢〉. Therefore, the probability that
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the combined state of the registers |¢〉⊗ |¢⊥〉 passes the symmetric subspace
verification is 12 . So, the probability of successful forging (and the expected
utility of the forger) is 12 , and hence, this scheme is forgeable.
In order to bypass this problem, we will use a form of amplification. A
public coin will instead consist of multiple private coins, let’s say κ many.
The private coins cannot be transacted discretely of their own but only in
sets of κ as a public coin; just like cents (denoted by ¢) and mills (denoted
by ) in the current world - cent coins, each of which is equivalent to ten
mills, are used in transactions, but mill coins are not used even though
as a unit they exist. Hence, we use |¢〉 to denote a public coin and | 〉
to denote a private coin in order to show the resemblance to the analogy
of coins and mills. Therefore, we define a public coin as |¢〉 := | 〉⊗κ, a
collection of κ private coins (| 〉). Again, to check the authenticity of the
coin, the verifier uses the valid public coin in his wallet (which, for the sake of
simplicity, contains only one public coin) and performs symmetric subspace
verifications of all the 2κ registers. In this setting, if an adversary A with 0
public coins produces an alleged public coin |ψ〉. Since the private scheme
is unforgeable, |ψ〉 must have a large overlap with the subspace, given by
the span of the states, which can be written as a tensor product of states
orthogonal to | 〉 (since every state in the orthogonal space of the subspace
mentioned above, will pass the private verification of at least one of its κ
registers). The combined state of the registers is hence
|ψ〉 ⊗ |¢〉 ≈ (| ⊥1 〉 ⊗ . . . | ⊥κ 〉)⊗ | 〉⊗κ,
which has an overlap of 1(2κκ )
with the symmetric subspace of the 2κ registers.
Therefore, by choosing κ = λ or even κ = logα(λ) for α > 1, A’s forging
probability in this attack, is negl(λ)(where λ is the security parameter).
A similar use of symmetric subspace operations was used in a recent work
on private quantum coins [JLS18]. Unfortunately, when more number of
coins are submitted, let’s say an adversary having n coins tries to pass
(n + 1) coins, the optimal success probability becomes (
(n+1)κ
nκ )
((n+2)κ(n+1)κ)
, which is
inverse polynomially close to 1 for n large enough. Hence, it is hard for
any adversary to produce two coins from one coins but it is fairly easier
to produce (n + 1) from n coins. However, a simple examination shows
that when taking into account that the money is lost in case of a failed
verification, the expected utility is either negative or positive but negligible.
This is what motivated us to define rational unforgeability, where we
want the expected gain of any adversary should be at best negligible.
Drawbacks Our construction includes three main drawbacks: The threat
model that we consider in our work is nonadaptive, and can be strengthened
in multiple directions: the adversary may learn the outcome of each veri-
fication, and attack in an adaptive fashion; the adversary can ask money
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that was verified back; the adversary may benefit from attacking several
victims. The way we prevent adaptive attacks is by putting the restriction
that the user can only pay coins received from the bank and not the ones
received from other users –see Section 3.1. Moreover, since our construction
is a comparison-based quantum money scheme, the user needs at least one
fresh coin in his wallet to receive money. We can only prove the security
properties of a public quantum coin (namely unforgeability, security against
sabotage and untraceability) under these restriction. A true public coin
should be secure even without these restrictions. Hence, our construction is
an almost public quantum coin scheme. Moreover in the nonadaptive threat
model, we use a slightly different utility function (see Eq. (4)) which is fairly
non-standard and is relevant only in some specific settings (see the discus-
sion after Definition 9 and the last paragraph in Section 3.1). Strengthening
the results to these more powerful adversarial models is left to future work.
Lastly, as was already mentioned, the unforgeability property holds only
in expectation and our construction is indeed forgeable in the usual sense –
see Section 4.
Scientific contribution
1. (Weak computational assumptions) As far as the authors are
aware, the construction comes closest to a provably secure quantum
public money based on standard hardness assumption, namely that a
quantum-secure one-way function exists. The existing public schemes
use stronger assumptions (to the point where we do not even have
candidate constructions that satisfy these assumptions, for example,
a quantum secure indistinguishability obfuscation), or that these con-
structions are not provably secure.
2. (Almost public coin scheme) Our construction comes very close
to satisfy the features of both public verifications and coins. Indeed,
there is currently no other public coin scheme.
3. (Quantum public key) Our construction also closely resembles a
public quantum money scheme with a quantum public key, a topic
that has not been studied. By itself, such a scheme is quite interesting
as it may defy some impossibility results (see Remark 16) regarding
unconditionally secure public quantum money schemes with a classical
public key. In fact, we managed to circumvent some of the impossibil-
ity results (see Appendix Theorem 11) by constructing an inefficient
scheme which is almost a public quantum money scheme and is un-
conditionally secure, based on a previous work [MS10]. This brings us
closer to answering the fundamental question of whether or not we can
construct an unconditionally secure public quantum money scheme.
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4. (Rational unforgeability) We also put forward a new notion of ra-
tional unforgeability, which is weaker than the usual notion of security
but still has strong guarantees. This might open up new possibilities
for new constructions, or as a way to circumvent impossibility results.
This notion is relevant in most of the cases as in reality users are ra-
tional parties rather than adversarial madmen. The authors are not
aware of any such notion in the context of quantum money.
5. (Modularity) The lifting technique used in our work lifts any private
quantum coin to an almost public quantum coin, preserving the three
main notions of security- security against forging, sabotage as well as
untraceability. Our techniques are fairly general, and we hope that
they can be possibly used to lift other cryptographic protocols that
closely resemble private coin scheme, to a public version without much
affecting the security guarantees.
Paper organization Section 2 contains notations (Section 2.1), prelimi-
naries (Section 2.2), definitions (Section 2.3) as well as the security notions
(Section 2.4). In Section 3, we describe our main result Theorem 11, our con-
struction (Algorithm 1) which on instantiating with previous works gives the
main result and then the restrictions (Section 3.1) that we need to impose
on our construction in order to assure security. In Section 4, we describe
(Section 4.1) and analyze (Section 4.2) a candidate attack against our con-
struction and also prove it is optimal in some sense (Section 4.3). Then use
the result regarding optimality to prove nonadaptive-rational-unforgeability
of our construction (Section 5). In Section 6, we discuss a few open questions
relevant to our work and the scope of future work in order to further improve
our construction. Nomenclature is given in Appendix A. In Appendix B,
we describe a few more results (see Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.3) for
our construction that were not discussed so far as well as describe attacks
against our construction (Appendix B.2) if we lift the restrictions mentioned
in Section 3.1. Appendix B.3 also contains the proof of completeness for our
construction.
2 Notations, preliminaries and definitions
2.1 Notations
This subsection contains some notations and conventions that will be re-
quired only in the proofs (Sections 4 and 5 and Appendix B.3).
1. We use H to represent Cd. We fix the local dimension of each register
to d, i.e., the state of each register is a unit vector (or an ensemble of
unit vectors) in H.
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2. We use Symn to denote the symmetric subspace of H over n registers.
Let ΠSymn to be the projection on to Symn. The symmetric subspace
over n registers is the set of all states on n register which remain the
same under any permutation of the registers. For more information
on the symmetric subspace, see [Har13].
3. For every vector ~j = (j0, j1, . . . jd−1) ∈ Nd such that
∑d−1
r=0 jr = n, we
denote
(n
~j
)
as
( n
j0,j1,...jd−1
)
.
4. Let Id,n be defined as Id,n := {(j0, j1, . . . , jd−1) ∈ Nd |
∑d−1
k=0 jk = n}
- see also Ref. [Har13, Notations].
5. For every vector ~i = (i1, . . . , in) in Znd we define T (~i) to be the vector
in Id,n whose kth entry (for k ∈ Zd) is the number of times k appears in
the vector~i – see also Ref. [Har13, discussion before Theorem 3.]. Note
that, |T−1(~j)| = (n~j). We shall represent the kth entry (for k ∈ Zd) of
T (~i) by (T (~i))k.
6. We extend | 〉 (a private coin) to an orthonormal basis of H denoted
by {|φj〉}j∈Zd such that |φ0〉 = | 〉 2. Hence,
|¢〉 = | 〉⊗κ = |φ0〉⊗κ. (1)
Clearly, this can be extended to a basis for H⊗n given by
{⊗nk=1|φik〉}~i∈Zn
d
.
7. Fix n, d ∈ N. For all ~j = (j0, . . . , jd−1) ∈ Id,n let, the states |Symn~j 〉
and |S˜ymn~j 〉 be defined as
|Symn~j 〉 = |Symn(j0,j1,...,jd−1)〉 :=
1√(n
~j
) ∑
~i:T (~i)=~j
|φi1 . . . φin〉, (2)
|S˜ymn~j 〉 := |¢〉 ⊗ |Symn~j 〉.
8. Let Symn and S˜ym
n
be sets defined as
Symn := {|Symn(j0,...,jd−1)〉}~j∈Id,n . (3)
S˜ym
n
:= {|S˜ymn~j 〉}~j∈Id,n .
2In Algorithm 2, we require that this basis is such that, the vector |1〉 has non-zero
overlap with only |φ0〉 (same as | 〉) and |φ1〉. In other words, the component of |1〉
orthogonal to | 〉 is proportional to |φ1〉. Such a basis exists and we fix such a basis for
our analysis.
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It is easy to see that Symn is an orthonormal set. Hence, the set
S˜ym
n
is also orthonormal. Moreover it can be shown that Symn is an
orthonormal basis for Symn – see also Ref. [Har13, Theorem 3]).
9. We will use bold letters to denote subspaces and use the same English
letter to denote a particular basis for the subspace, for example - Symn
and Symn.
10. For any state |ψ〉, we will use |ψ˜〉 to denote the state |¢〉⊗|ψ〉. Similarly,
for any subspace A, we will use A˜ to represent the subspace {|¢〉 ⊗
|ψ〉 | |ψ〉 ∈ A}. In a similar way for any basis B we will use B˜ to
denote
{|¢〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 | |ψ〉 ∈ B}.
11. For any hermitian operator H, we use λmax(H) to denote the largest
eigenvalue of H.
2.2 Preliminaries
In this section we will recall some definitions regarding quantum money as
well as some tools from linear algebra.
Definition 2 (Private quantum money (adapted from [Aar09])). A private
quantum money scheme consists of the three Quantum Polynomial Time
(QPT) algorithms: key-gen, mint and verify.3
1. key-gen takes a security parameter 1λ and outputs a classical secret
key, sk.
2. mint takes the secret key and prepares a quantum money state |$〉.4
3. verify receives the secret key and an (alleged) quantum money state ρ,
which it either accepts or rejects. We emphasize that verify does not
output the post measurement state.
Completeness: the quantum money scheme has perfect completeness if
for all λ
Pr[sk ← key-gen(1λ); |$〉 ← mint(sk) : verify(sk, |$〉) = accept] = 1.
Notice that repeated calls to mint could produce different money states, just
like dollar bills, which have serial numbers, and therefore these are not exact
3Note that we are implicitly assuming that the quantum money scheme is stateless.
Indeed, for a stateful scheme this definition does not hold, for example - [AMR19]. We
will be only concerned with stateless quantum money schemes in this work.
4Even though in most generality the quantum money state may be a mixed state, in
all schemes we are aware of the money state is pure, and we use the pure state formalism
for brevity.
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copies of each other. Hence, we use |$〉 to denote the potentially unique
banknotes produced by mint, in order to show the resemblance to dollar bills.
For any subspace A, we will use A⊥ to denote the orthogonal subspace
of A and ΠA to denote the projection onto A. For any linear operator T we
use ker(T ) to denote the kernel of T and Im(T ) to denote the image of T .
We will use Tr(ρ) to denote the trace of the matrix ρ, for any matrix ρ. For
any set S, we use Span(S) to denote the subspace spanned by S.
2.3 Definitions
In this section we will see some new definitions that would be relevant for
our work.
Definition 3 (Inefficient Quantum Money). In a money scheme, if at least
one of the three algorithms - key-gen, mint and verify is not QPT, then it is
called an inefficient money scheme.
We generalize the definition of public quantum money given in [Aar09]
by allowing the verification key or the public key to be a quantum state and
not necessarily a classical string.
Definition 4 (Public quantum money (generalized from [Aar09])). A public
quantum money scheme consists of four QPT algorithms: private-key-gen,
public-key-gen (same as verification-key-gen), mint and verify. Usually public
quantum money has one algorithm key-gen that produces a private-public key
pair but we break this into two algorithms private-key-gen and public-key-gen
for the ease of analysis.
1. key-gen takes a security parameter 1λ and outputs a secret key sk.
2. public-key-gen takes the secret key, and prepares a quantum verification
key, denoted |v〉.
3. mint takes the secret key and prepares a quantum money state |$〉.
4. verify receives a quantum verification key |v〉 and an (alleged) quan-
tum money state ρ, and either accepts or rejects but never returns the
money. If money is returned after verification then it might lead to
adaptive attacks which we do not discuss in our work. Therefore, we
deviate from the definitions used in other constructions in order to
prevent adaptive attacks.
Completeness: the quantum money scheme has perfect completeness if for
all λ
Pr[sk ← key-gen(1λ); |v〉 ← public-key-gen(sk); |$〉 ← mint(sk) : verify(|v〉, |$〉) = accept] = 1.
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We require that even after repeated successful verifications of correct money
states of the form |$〉 ← mint(sk) using the same verification key |v〉, for a
new note |$˜〉 ← mint(sk),
verify(|v〉, |$〉) = accept] = 1,
, i.e., the completeness property holds even after repeated calls of verify.
Note that the quantum public key might change due to both valid and invalid
verifications. We use |$〉 to denote money states for the same reason as
discussed in Definition 2.
In all the existing constructions of money schemes, the public key is a
classical string and not a quantum state. Although the scheme we construct
is similar to a quantummoney scheme with a quantum public key, technically
it is what we call a comparison-based definition – see Definition 5. It differs
from the quantum money scheme mainly in that the verification key that
it uses is the quantum money itself, and therefore, the security notion is
slightly different.
When comparing a quantum public money scheme with a classical key
and a quantum money scheme with a public quantum key, the main differ-
ence is that the verify algorithm of the latter could be thought of as a stateful
rather than a stateless protocol. This is because the quantum state that is
used as the key can change between different calls to verify. As is often
the case in cryptographic protocols, the security definitions and analysis of
stateful protocols require more care than for their stateless counterparts. A
(private or public) quantum money scheme may output different quantum
money states in response to consecutive calls of mint(sk). We call the money
produced by such schemes quantum bills.
Definition 5 (Quantum Coins (adapted from [MS10])). A (private or pub-
lic) quantum coin scheme is a scheme in which repeated calls of mint() pro-
duce the same (pure)5 state. We will use |¢〉 to denote a public coin and | 〉
to denote a private coin.
In a public coin scheme with comparison-based verification, verify uses
one coin as its initial public key.
Definition 6 (Public Quantum Coins with Private Verification). In a public
coin scheme withe private verification, we have in addition to the public
verification algorithm, verifypk(·), a private verification algorithm verifysk(·).
These two algorithms may function differently. Note that this public key pk
can potentially be a quantum state |v〉.
In our construction, a public coin is a collection of private coins. Hence,
we will use |¢〉 to denote a public coin and | 〉 to denote a private coin.
5May not be true for stateful constructions such as [AMR19].
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Definition 7 (Count). In any quantum money schemeM, Count is a pro-
cedure that takes a key and a number of alleged quantum money states and
runs the verification algorithm on them one by one and outputs the number
of valid quantum states that passed verification.
In a private quantum money scheme, Count implicitly takes sk gener-
ated using key-gen(1λ) as key whereas in a comparison-based public quantum
money scheme instead, Count takes the wallet as key (where the wallet is ini-
tialized to a valid coin using mint(sk)). In case of all public quantum money
schemes, key is the public key |v〉 generated by verification-key-gen(sk).
In case of public quantum coin with private verification there are two
Count operations - one for the public verification and the other for the private
verification.
2.4 Different notions of security
In rational unforgeability, each user has its own utility (or gain) and adopts
the best strategy possible to optimize its expected utility. The scheme is
secured if in expectation the utility for an user is at best negligible. This is
a relaxation of the usual notion of unforgeability where we want the utility
to be greater than 0 with at most negligible probability. Next we define a
general framework to analyze nonadaptive attacks in the rational sense.
In case of public quantum coin scheme with private verification, the
Count() used in the next experiment, Experiment 1 will be the public Count.
For any (private, public or comparison-based public money scheme) quan-
tum money scheme M, we define the following experiment. (Below, for a
private or comparison-based verification scheme, we use the convention that
verification-key-gen outputs ⊥.)
nonadaptive-unforgeableA,Mλ :
1 : sk ← key-gen(1λ)
2 : ρ ≡ (ρ1, . . . , ρm) ρi can be potentially entangled←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Amint(sk),verification-key-gen(sk)(1λ)
3 : Denote by n the number of times that the mint(sk) oracle was called by A
4 : m′ ← Count(ρ)
5 : Output:m′, n.
Experiment 1: Nonadaptive Unforgeability Experiment
With respect to Experiment 1, we define the following quantities.
U(A) =
{
m− n, if m = m′,
−n, otherwise. (4)
U˜(A) = m′ − n. (5)
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We shall refer to U(A) as the utility of the adversary A.
In the nonadaptive-unforgeable experiment (Experiment 1), the mint(sk)
oracle outputs a money state (no matter what the input is), thus providing
a way for the forger to receive as much money as it wants to perform the
forging.
Similarly, the verification-key-gen(sk) outputs the verification key. Note
that the adversary can use the verification-key-gen(sk) oracle multiple times.
In the classical case, that would not make any difference (there is no need
for multiple keys), but in the quantum case, the adversary’s actions could
give it an advantage – e.g., perhaps the secret key could be extracted from
multiple copies of the quantum verification key, but not from a single copy
of the verification key.
Definition 8 (Nonadaptive-rational-unforgeability). A money scheme M
is nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable if for every QPA (Quantum Poly-time
Algorithm) A in Experiment 1 there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such
that,
E(U(A)) ≤ negl(λ) , (6)
where U(A) is as defined in Eq. (4).
Definition 9 (Nonadaptive-Unforgeability [Aar09]). A money scheme M
is nonadaptive-unforgeable if for every QPA A in Experiment 1 there exists
a negligible function negl(λ) such that,
Pr[U˜(A) > 0] ≤ negl(λ) . (7)
where U˜(A) is as defined in Eq. (5).
Note that, U(A) > 0 implies U˜(A) > 0 and hence, if Eq. (7) holds, then
Eq. (6) also holds. Therefore, a scheme is nonadaptive-unforgeable implies it
is nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable. The other way around however, is not
true as we will see in case of our construction.
One would expect that U(A), the utility of the adversary A is instead
defined to be the same as U˜(A). Indeed the definition of U(A) should be
U˜(A) in order to discuss most general settings, but unfortunately, for our
construction, it is very hard to analyze with respect to such a definition
of U(A). Hence, we use a relaxed definition of U(A) (as given in Eq. (4))
under which it is technically simpler and easier to analyze our construction.
It is true that this definition of the utility U(A) is harsh on the adversary
A. Indeed, according to the definition of utility U(A) given in Eq. (4) with
respect to Experiment 1, we either accept all the coins or no coins. This
is quite relevant to the setting in which only one kind of coins are used
for a particular item. Suppose a person goes to buy a TV from an honest
seller but is allowed to buy only one TV. He puts all the money on the table
according to the worth of the TV he plans to buy. The seller either approves
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the transaction and gives a TV or rejects and simply says no to the user
but does not return the money back to the buyer. Even if one of the money
states fail verification, the seller does not approve the transaction.
Definition 10 (Unconditional security). We call an adversary that can ap-
ply poly(λ), and if queries to the oracles, but that is otherwise computation-
ally unbounded an unbounded adversary.
For all the security notions above, we define an unconditional security
flavor, in which the definition is with respect to unbounded adversaries.
Note that, for a nonadaptive-unforgeable (stateless) private money scheme
in Experiment 1, the parameters m and n, denoting the number of coins,
the adversary submits and the number of correct coins, it takes from the
mint, respectively, cannot be exponential6. If the adversary is allowed to
get exponentially many copies of the coin, then it can use standard tomog-
raphy to learn the unique quantum state of the coin. On the other hand,
if it is allowed to submit exponentially many coins, then he can submit the
maximally mixed state, exponentially many times, which would result in an
non-negligible success probability in Experiment 1.
3 Our construction and results
Our main result is the following
Theorem 11. There exists a comparison-based public quantum coin scheme
(see Definition 5) which is private-untraceable and nonadaptive-rationally-
secure, i.e., both nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable and nonadaptive-rationally-
-secure-against-sabotage (see Definition 8), based on quantum secure one-way
functions.
Furthermore, there exists an inefficient (see Definition 3) receive-only
comparison-based public quantum money that is private-untraceable and un-
conditionally nonadaptive-rationally-secure.
Notice that we have not yet discussed the definition of nonadaptive-
-rationally-secure and private-untraceable money schemes. The definitions
(Definition 27 and Definition 32) is given in Appendix B.1. We delay the
discussion to Appendix B.1 for two reasons - unforgeability is the most im-
portant security notion, and the other two security notions, namely security
against sabotage and untraceability, are not that interesting to discuss. The
proof is given in Appendix B.3 on p. 60. We now discuss our construction
that achieves it.
6For a stateful private money scheme, it is indeed possible to have both m and n
arbitrary, for example - [AMR19]
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Suppose Pr-QC is a private coin scheme (with algorithms Pr-QC.key-gen,
Pr-QC.mint and Pr-QC.verify). We define a public coin scheme as follows.
Pk-QC.key-gen is the same as Pr-QC.key-gen, and Pk-QC.mint produces κ
coins of the private quantum coin scheme instead of one using Pr-QC.mint
(needs to be written in an algorithm). Hence, each public quantum coin is
a collection of κ private quantum coins where κ ∈ logc(λ), c > 1. We define
a wallet where we keep the public coins. When the user receives a new coin
for verification, it uses the public coins already in the wallet for verification.
On successful verification, it adds the new coin to the wallet. Initially the
wallet is instantiated with one valid coin Pk-QC.mint(sk) from the bank. If
at any point the wallet has m public coins, then the running of Pk-QC.verify
on the one new coin that was received executes a projective measurement
into the symmetric subspace on the combined (m+1)κ registers of the wallet
and the new coin. If the projective measurement succeeds, the verification
algorithm accepts the new coin as authentic. The formal description of our
construction is given in the algorithm (see Algorithm 1). We denote ΠSymn to
denote the orthogonal projection onto the symmetric subspace of n registers.
It is known that the measurement {ΠSymn , (I − ΠSymn)} can be efficiently
implemented [BBD+97]. From now onward, we will use the convention that
for every algorithm A, we sometime use the pure state formalism and write
A(|ψ〉) instead of A(|ψ〉〈ψ|).
The construction Algorithm 1 is an example of a comparison-based pub-
lic quantum coin scheme with private verification where verify and verifybank
are interpreted as verifypk and verifysk respectively and similarly for Count
and Countbank.
It is easy to see that our construction is complete.
Proposition 12. The quantum public coin scheme Pk-QC is complete.
The proof is given in Appendix B.3 on p. 55.
Our construction also satisfies nonadaptive rational unforgeability, de-
fined in the previous section (Definition 8).
Proposition 13. The scheme Pk-QC in Algorithm 1 is nonadaptive-rational-
ly-unforgeable (see Definition 8) if the underlying private scheme Pr-QC is
nonadaptive-unforgeable (see Definition 9) and Pr-QC.verify is a rank-1 pro-
jective measurement. Moreover if the Pr-QC is nonadaptive-unconditionally-
-unforgeable (see Definition 9 and Definition 10) then the Pk-QC will be
unconditionally nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable (see Definition 8 and Def-
inition 10). If the underlying Pr-QC scheme is inefficient then the Pk-QC
will also be inefficient but still all the results will hold.
The proof is given in Section 5 on p. 38.
Later in Section 4 (see Algorithm 2), we show that the relaxation of the
unforgeability notion to rational unforgeability is necessary, and that strict
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Algorithm 1 Construction of Pk-QC: A public quantum coin scheme
1: procedure key-gen(1λ)
2: (∅, sk)← Pr-QC.key-gen(λ) . Note that there is no public key.
3: return (∅, sk)
4: end procedure
5: procedure mint(sk)
6: κ ≡ log(λ)c for some constant c > 1.
7: | 〉⊗κ ← ((Pr-QC.mint(sk))⊗κ
8: return |¢〉 = | 〉⊗κ
9: end procedure
10: Init: ω ← mint(sk) . Before running the first verification, we assume
the user receives one valid public coin from the bank.
11: procedure verify(ρ)
12: Denote by ω˜ the combined wallet state ω and the new coin ρ. .
Note that ω˜ is not necessarily ω ⊗ ρ since they might be entangled.
13: Measure the state ω˜ with respect to the two-outcome measurement
{ΠSymκ·(1+m) , I −ΠSymκ·(1+m)}.
14: Denote the post measurement state the new wallet state ω.
15: m← m+ 1
16: if Outcome is ΠSymκ·(1+m) then
17: accept.
18: else
19: reject. . Note that we do not return any register
to the person submitting the coins for verification; We only notify them
that the coins were rejected.
20: end if
21: end procedure
22: procedure Count|¢〉((ρ1, . . . , ρm)) . Here, each ρi represents a state
over κ registers
23: Set Counter ← 0.
24: Run Init to initialize the wallet ω ← |¢〉 = mint(sk).
25: for i = 1 to m do
26: Run verify(ρi)
27: if verify(ρi) = accept then
28: Counter = Counter + 1.
29: end if
30: end for
31: Output Counter.
32: end procedure
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33: procedure verifybank(sk, ρ). Here, ρ represents a state over κ registers.
34: k ← Pr-QC.Count(sk, ρ)
35: if k = κ then
36: accept
37: else
38: reject
39: end if
40: end procedure
41: procedure Countbank(sk, (ρ1, . . . , ρm)) . Here, ρi represents a state
over κ registers
42: Set Counter ← 0.
43: for i = 1 to m do
44: Run verifybank(ρi)
45: if verifybank(ρi) = accept then
46: Counter = Counter + 1.
47: end if
48: end for
49: Output Counter.
50: end procedure
nonadaptive unforgeability does not hold for our construction, Pk-QC. In
fact, the attack succeeds with probability, inverse polynomially close to 1
(see Section 4.2).
Our construction also satisfies other security properties, namely, secu-
rity against sabotage and untraceability but under some restrictions. We
elaborately discuss these properties in Appendix B.1.
We instantiate our construction (see Algorithm 1) Pk-QC with the pri-
vate quantum coin schemes in [JLS18, BS19] and [MS10] (as the underlying
Pr-QC scheme). The private coin schemes provide the following results
Theorem 14 (Restated from [JLS18, Theorem 6]). If quantum-secure one-
way functions exist, then there exists a private quantum coin scheme that
is nonadaptive-unforgeable (see Definition 9) such that the verification algo-
rithm is a rank-1 projective measurement.
Theorem 15 (Weak Version Restated from [MS10, Theorem 4.2]). There
exists an inefficient private quantum coin scheme that is nonadaptive-unconditionally-
-unforgeable (see Definition 9 and Definition 10).
Combining the lifting result ( Proposition 13) with Theorem 14 and
Theorem 15 gives us the main result, Theorem 11.
Remark 16. As noted by Aaronson and Christiano [AC13]:
It is easy to see that, if public-key quantum money is pos-
sible, then it must rely on some computational assumption, in
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addition to the No-Cloning Theorem. This is because a coun-
terfeiter with unlimited time could simply search for a state |ψ〉
that the (publicly-known) verification procedure accepted.
Although this argument holds equally well for most public quantum money
schemes, it breaks down when the public scheme uses a quantum state as
the public key: As the exponential number of verifications could perturb
the public quantum key, a state that passes verification by the perturbed
quantum key may fail with a fresh quantum key. Note that by tweaking
the definition of public quantum money, i.e., by adding the notion of a
public quantum key, we managed to circumvent this impossibility result in
Theorem 11.
3.1 How to use Pk-QC: User manual
Motivation Our construction Pk-QC (see Algorithm 1), is nonadaptive-
-rationally-unforgeable (see Definition 8), but we don’t know if it is secure
against adaptive attacks. One way to avoid adaptive attacks is by for-
bidding the spending of received money from others, thereby preventing
adaptive attacks. This also prevents privacy related attacks as discussed in
Appendix B, since money received from other users are never spent. More-
over, we require a non-standard definition of utility, in order to prove that
our scheme is nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable. This requires that in every
transaction, the user either approves all the coins (if all of them pass verifi-
cation) or approves none. The users are allowed to go to the bank to get a
refund or valuation of the coins, they posses. There can be potential sabo-
tage attacks where an honest user, after doing transaction with adversarial
merchant, gets a refund less than what he should get. We require a slightly
non-standard way of refund from the bank in order to prove that sabotage
attacks are avoided, i.e., the honest users do not got cheated (discussed in
detail, in Appendix B.1). This non-standard way of refund is needed only
to ensure security against sabotage.
Specification Our construction Pk-QC, (see Algorithm 1) should be used
in the following way - the user starts with a wallet called the spending
wallet which contains public coins from the bank. The user can simply
pay the coins from his spending wallet to other users during transactions.
The receiver also possesses multiple receiving wallets - one receiving wallet
per received payment. In order to receive a payment, the user needs to
have at least one coin in his spending wallet.The receiver brings out one
coin from his spending wallet and creates a separate receiving wallet with
that coin. He uses this new wallet to receive and apply Pk-QC.verify() on
the received sum from the payer. The transaction is approved if and only
if the Pk-QC.verify() accepts all the coins of the submitted sum using the
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newly formed receiving wallet. If the transaction fails, the receiver doesn’t
return any state to the (cheating) payer. At any point, any user can go
and get a refund of his receiving wallets. To refund any given receiving
wallet, the bank applies Pr-QC.verify on the wallet and gives a refund of
bPr-QC.Count(ρ)/κc many fresh public coins. The remaining fraction of a
coin (namely, Pr-QC.Count(ρ)/κ− bPr-QC.Count(ρ)/κc) would be added to
the user’s bank account (that can be taken into account in later refunds),
since a refund cannot contain a fraction of a (public) coin.7
Analysis of the receive-only mode The user manual is well-suited for
our construction, Pk-QC, described in Algorithm 1 as well as for any com-
parison based public quantum coin scheme with private verification. In the
user manual, we implicitly assume that the verification of the money scheme
is done using wallets initialized by a fresh coin which is very similar to com-
parison based verification. We also require a separate private procedure
for the bank’s refund. Hence, the user manual implicitly assumes that the
scheme in use is a public quantum coin scheme with private verification.
Note that, every received wallet is used only once to receive and verify
a transaction, which is either successful, and all the coins are approved, or
none of the coins are accepted. Hence, the user manual indeed ensures the
non-standard utility definition that we use in Definition 8.
It can be shown that if the user manual is followed, any cheating ad-
versary can be viewed as an adversary in a multiple verifier version of Ex-
periment 3. This can be shown as follows. If the underlying Pr-QC scheme
is nonadaptive-unforgeable, a nonadaptive forging attack against multiple
verifiers can be reduced to a nonadaptive sabotage attack against multiple
verifiers, i.e., the expected utility in the forging attack is less than the ex-
pected loss in the sabotage attack, up to negligible correction. Moreover, for
any nonadaptive sabotage attack against multiple verifiers, we can construct
a nonadaptive sabotage attack against a single verifier (see Experiment 3),
without much decrease in the expected loss. Our scheme, Pk-QC is indeed
nonadaptive-rationally-secure-against-sabotage (see Proposition 28). There-
fore, the user manual ensures that, if our scheme, Pk-QC (see Algorithm 1)
is nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable, then any forging attack on the scheme
can only result in negligible utility on expectation. The last reduction (from
multiple to single verifier sabotage) can be done by randomly choosing one
of the many verifiers to target, and simulating the rest. In order to simulate
other verifiers, the sabotage adversary against a single verifier, is required
to have oracle access to Pr-QC.verify. Note that, this is not allowed in Ex-
periment 3. Hence, we require a stronger definition of nonadaptive rational
7We use this definition of bank’s refund in order to prove sabotage attacks are not
possible. In case, the designer of the money scheme does not care about the security
against sabotage, the bank’s refund could simply be defined as Countbank(ρ), where ρ is
the quantum state of the given receiving wallet.
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security against sabotage than Definition 26. Nevertheless, the proof of non-
adaptive rational security against sabotage for our scheme (Proposition 28),
given on p. 55, can be adapted to show that our scheme is nonadaptive
rationally secure against sabotage even in the strong definition8.
The user manual also prevents untraceability attacks, such as the one
described in Algorithm 5 (see Appendix B for more details). Moreover,
the definition of the bank’s refund ensures that any kind of sabotage attack
against our scheme Pk-QC (with this user manual), can be reduced to an ad-
versary in the nonadaptive-rationally-secure-against-sabotage security game,
Experiment 3. Hence, if our scheme is nonadaptive-rationally-secure-against-
-sabotage, then any sabotage attack can only result in negligible loss of the
honest user, on expectation.
If we manage to prove the unforgeability of our construction against these
adaptive attack models, and if untraceability is not an issue, then there is
still hope that we can lift these restrictions, and allow only one wallet for
both paying and receiving coins. Moreover, if the user uses more than one
fresh coins to verify a given coin, the advantage for the untraceability attack,
given in Algorithm 5 is small. The success probability is 12(n+1) , where n is
the number of coins used by the honest user to verify a coin (see the analysis
of the attack described in Algorithm 5). Hence, it might still be possible that
users with high privacy concerns, can use our public coins scheme without
the receive-only restrictions, provided they verify every coin received, using
a large number of fresh coins.
Potential use case Although the user manual seems too restrictive to use
it is relevant and applicable in various cases. For example consider a shop
selling electronic goods such as TV or computer, the vendor usually receives
money from buyers and gives the item to the buyer only if it the transaction
is successful. In general, the vendor never has to pay. In particular the credit
card terminal machine 9 that are used in practice operate in a receive-only
manner. Similarly, the vendor can operate through quantum coins using
the user manual - receiving the sum of money from buyers into separate
receiving wallets (one for each transaction), and approving the transaction
only if all the coins pass. She can go to the bank later to get a refund of her
receiving wallets.
8In fact, the proof does not require any assumption on the state submitted by the
adversary.
9A typical credit card terminal also allows refunds. In our setting, it is not so simple;
the vendor needs to pay from his spending wallet in order to refund.
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4 Unforgeability
As mentioned earlier, our construction is not unforgeable according to the
usual unforgeability notions, i.e., the scheme Pk-QC is not nonadaptive-
-unforgeable (see Definition 9). In the next two subsections, Sections 4.1
and 4.2, we discuss a class of nonadaptive attacks (see Algorithm 2) on our
construction parameterized by n,m ∈ poly(λ). In Section 4.3, we prove
that for any nonadaptive QPT adversary which takes n coins from the mint
and submits m alleged coins, the attack has the maximum probability (up
to negligible corrections) for passing all the m verifications provided the un-
derlying private scheme, Pr-QC (the private scheme that we lift to Pk-QC in
Algorithm 1) is nonadaptive-unforgeable (see Definition 9). The analysis of
this attack will be vital in the proof of nonadaptive rational unforgeability
for our construction, given in Section 5.
4.1 Candidate nonadaptive attack
The class of attacks parameterized bym,n ∈ N such thatm > n, is described
in Algorithm 2 which is a nonadaptive forgery attack in which the adversary
gets n coins from the mint and submits m alleged coins. Hence, for every n,
the attack is successful if running Pk-QC.Count|¢〉() (see Line 22) on the sub-
mitted coins reads m. The construction of the state |Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉
Algorithm 2 A class of Nonadaptive attacks on the scheme Pk-QC, param-
eterized by n
Obtain n copies of public coins |¢〉⊗n ← (Pk-QC.mint(sk))⊗n
Construct the mκ register state |Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉 (see Notations in
Section 2.1) which is the same as
1√(mκ
nκ
) ∑
~i,T (~i)=(nκ,(m−n)κ,0,...)
|φi1〉 ⊗ · · · |φimκ〉.
Submit the state |Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉 to the verifier.
from |¢〉⊗n can be done as follows: Add (m − n)κ registers each initialized
to |1〉 to the nκ registers and call these mκ registers the input registers.10
Note that the underlying private scheme Pr-QC is nonadaptive-unforgeable.
In particular the state |1〉, which can be prepared efficiently, must have very
little fidelity with the correct coin state |¢〉, otherwise the QPT algorithm
which produces the state |1〉 can nonadaptively forge the scheme Pr-QC.
10We use the fact that the basis for H, that we fixed in Item 6 in Section 2.1, is such
that the vector |1〉 has non-zero overlap with only |φ0〉 (same as | 〉 and |φ1〉. Hence,
the component of |1〉, orthogonal to |mill〉 (which is overwhelmingly large in our case), is
proportional to |φ1〉.
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Therefore the state has overwhelmingly high fidelity with a state of the
form | 〉tensornκ ⊗ | ⊥〉tensor(m−n)κ where | ⊥〉 is some state orthogonal to
| 〉. The fidelity of | ⊥〉 with |1〉 is overwhelmingly large.
Add another mκ work registers initialized to
1√(mκ
nκ
) ∑
~i,T (~i)=(nκ,(m−n)κ,0,...)
|i1〉 ⊗ · · · |imκ〉.
Apply control swap operation controlled at the work registers to get the
following intermediate state with high fidelity
1√(mκ
nκ
) ∑
~i,T (~i)=(nκ,(m−n)κ,0,...)
(|φi1〉 ⊗ · · · |φimκ〉)⊗ (|i1〉 ⊗ · · · |imκ〉) .
Apply C-Swap operations again but this time controlled on the input reg-
isters. Since the state | ⊥〉 is very close to |1〉 (fidelity wise) applying the
C-Swap operation is almost the same as disentangling the work and the input
registers such that we are left with a pure state in the input registers which
has an overwhelmingly high fidelity with the state |Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉.
4.2 Analysis of the attack
Clearly, |Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉 is a symmetric state such that
Pr[Pr-QC.Count(|Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉) = nκ] = 1,
for every n and m > n. Hence, the attack does not violate the nonadaptive
unforgeability (see Definition 9) of the underlying private scheme Pr-QC.
Next, for every n and m > n, the success probability of the attack:
Pr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉) = m] =
(mκ
nκ
)((m+1)κ
(n+1)κ
) . (8)
This can be seen in the following way. Observe that the combined state of
the new coins and the wallet (initialized to |¢〉) just before the Pk-QC.Count
operation (see Line 22 in Algorithm 1) is |S˜ymmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉 (similar to
ω˜ in Line 12 in Algorithm 1). Recall,
|S˜ymmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉 = |¢〉 ⊗ |Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉
= |φ0〉⊗κ ⊗ |Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉.
For notations, see Eq. (2) and Eq. (1) in Section 2.1. Notice that, |S˜ymmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉
has a non-trivial overlap with only one vector in the basis Sym(m+1)κ, which
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is |Sym(m+1)κ((n+1)κ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉. It is not hard to see that
∣∣∣〈Sym(m+1)κ((n+1)κ,(m−n)κ...)|S˜ymmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉∣∣∣2 =
(mκ
nκ
)((m+1)κ
(n+1)κ
) .
Hence, the overlap of |S˜ymmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉 with Sym(m+1)κ is (
mκ
nκ)
((m+1)κ(n+1)κ)
. This
completes the derivation of Eq. (8).
Next we show that the attack described in Algorithm 2 also shows that
our scheme Pk-QC is not nonadaptive-unforgeable in the traditional sense.
Note that, the probability of passing at least (n+ 1) verifications out of m
is
Pr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉) > n]
≥ Pr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉) = m]
=
(mκ
nκ
)((m+1)κ
(n+1)κ
) .
Therefore, our scheme is not nonadaptive-unforgeable in the traditional sense.
For m = n + 1, the term simplifies to (
((n+1)κ
nκ )
((n+2)κ(n+1)κ)
. It can be shown that
the term (
((n+1)κ
nκ )
((n+2)κ(n+1)κ)
asymptotically converges to 1 when n → ∞. Hence, the
scheme Pk-QC is not nonadaptive-unforgeable. Moreover, a little analysis also
shows that for n = c·κ and taking the limit of large κ, the term goes to e−1/c,
although we do not use it in any our results. When n = 1, the expression
becomes (
2κ
κ )
(3κκ )
and for κ large enough (logc(λ), c > 1 ), the expression is
negligible.
4.3 Optimal success probability for nonadaptive forgery
In this section we will prove the optimality (up to negligible corrections) of
the attack given in Algorithm 2 in Section 4.1.
Proposition 17 (optimality of the attack). Suppose Pr-QC is nonadaptive-
unforgeable (see Definition 9), and Pr-QC.verify is a rank-1 projective mea-
surement. Consider a nonadaptive QPT adversary, which takes n coins from
the mint and submits m registers such that m,n ∈ poly(λ), and m > n.
For such an adversary, the attack described in Algorithm 2 is optimal (i.e.,
has the highest possible probability that all m are accepted), up to addi-
tive negligible corrections, against Pk-QC (see Algorithm 1). Moreover if
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the underlying Pr-QC scheme is nonadaptive-unconditionally-unforgeable (see
Definition 9 and Definition 10), then the attack is optimal even for com-
putationally unbounded adversaries. Note that even for such an adversary,
m,n ∈ poly(λ), i.e., it can submit and receive polynomially many coins.
The full proof is given on p. 29. The proof follows by combining the se-
curity guarantees of the underlying Pr-QC scheme along with some algebraic
results that we are going to see in the next lemmas.
For every m,n ∈ N such that m > n, let Goodmκ,nκ, G˜oodmκ,nκ, Badmκ,nκ
and B˜admκ,nκ and be subspaces defined as
Goodmκ,nκ := {|ψ〉 ∈ (H)mκ|Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |ψ〉〈ψ|) ≤ nκ] = 1},
G˜ood
mκ,nκ
:= {|¢〉 ⊗ |ψ〉||ψ〉 ∈ Goodmκ,nκ}.
Badmκ,nκ := (Goodmκ,nκ)⊥,
B˜ad
mκ,nκ := {|¢〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 | |ψ〉 ∈ Badmκ,nκ}. (9)
Since we assume that Pr-QC.verify is a rank-1 projective measurement (| 〉〈 |, I−
| 〉〈 |), Goodmκ,nκ is essentially the span of all the states with at least
(m − n)κ out of the mκ registers having quantum state orthogonal to | 〉
and G˜ood
mκ,nκ
is the subspace of all (κ+mκ) registers such that the quan-
tum state of the first κ registers is |¢〉 and the state of the rest mκ register
is a vector in Goodmκ,nκ. Similarly, the subspace B˜admκ,nκ consists of all
(κ + mκ) registers such that the quantum state of the first κ registers is
|¢〉 and the state of the rest mκ register is a vector in Badmκ,nκ. Since we
assume that the underlying Pr-QC scheme is nonadaptive-unforgeable (see
Definition 9), if any adversary in the unforgeability experiment (Experi-
ment 1) against Pk-QC takes n public coins and submits m (which is greater
than n) alleged coins then the quantum state of the submitted coins must
have an overwhelming overlap with Goodmκ,nκ and negligible overlap with
Badmκ,nκ. Every vector in G˜ood
mκ,nκ
(resp. B˜admκ,nκ) represents the com-
bined state of the verifier’s wallet (initialized to |¢〉) and a κm register state
in Goodmκ,nκ (resp. Badmκ,nκ) submitted by the adversary, just before the
Pk-QC.Count|¢〉() operation (see Line 22 in Algorithm 1).
Clearly the subspaces B˜admκ,nκ and G˜ood
mκ,nκ
are orthogonal spaces. It
follows from the definition that for every m,n ∈ N and m > n,
G˜ood
mκ,nκ ⊂ Goodκ+mκ,κ+nκ. (10)
The relation between the subspaces Good(m+1)κ,(n+1)κ, G˜ood
mκ,nκ
, Bad(m+1)κ,(n+1)κ
and B˜admκ,nκ is described in Fig. 1. The subspace Im(ΠSym(m+1)κ ·ΠG˜oodmκ,nκ),
the image of G˜ood
mκ,nκ
under ΠSym(m+1)κ , is also of great importance and
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its relation with the good and bad subspaces are also shown in the figure.
The following few lemmas prove that this is indeed the case.
෫𝔾𝕠𝕠𝕕𝑚𝜅,𝑛𝜅
𝕀𝕞 Π𝕊𝕪𝕞 𝑚+1 𝜅Π෫𝔾𝕠𝕠𝕕𝑚𝜅,𝑛𝜅
෫𝔹𝕒𝕕𝑚𝜅,𝑛𝜅
𝔹𝕒𝕕(𝑚+1)𝜅, (𝑛+1)𝜅 𝔾𝕠𝕠𝕕 𝑚+1 𝜅, (𝑛+1)𝜅
Figure 1: In this figure, we see the relation between the different subspaces.
The space H(m+1)κ represented by the entire large rectangle is decomposed
as the direct sum of the spaces Good(m+1)κ,(n+1)κ and Bad(m+1)κ,(n+1)κ rep-
resented by the left and right rectangles respectively. The subspace la-
beled Im(ΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ) in the figure, is the image of the operator
ΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ .
Lemma 18. Badmκ,nκ is the same as the subspace
{|ψ〉 ∈ (H)mκ|Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |ψ〉〈ψ|) > nκ] = 1},
where Goodmκ,nκ is as defined in Eq. (9). Moreover, for any mκ register state
|α〉 := a1|α1〉+ a2|α2〉 such that |α1〉 ∈ Goodmκ,nκ and |α2〉 ∈ Badmκ,nκ,
Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |α〉) > nκ] = |a2|2.
The proof is given on p. 32.
Let Π
B˜ad
mκ,nκ and Π
G˜ood
mκ,nκ denote the projection operators on to the
subspaces B˜admκ,nκ and G˜ood
mκ,nκ
respectively (see Eq. (9) for the definition
of G˜ood
mκ,nκ
). The following holds:
Lemma 19. For every m,n ∈ N and m > n,
Π
B˜ad
mκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ = 0,
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where ΠSym(m+1)κ is the projection on to the symmetric subspace Sym
mκ (see
Item 2 in Section 2.1).
The proof is given on p. 32. It might seem that the operators ΠSym(m+1)κ
and Π
G˜ood
mκ,nκ commute and since B˜admκ,nκ and G˜ood
mκ,nκ
are orthogonal
spaces, Lemma 19 follows. It is not hard to show that this is not the case
and as shown in Fig. 1,
Im(ΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ) 6⊂ G˜ood
mκ,nκ
.
Hence,
[ΠSym(m+1)κ ,ΠG˜oodmκ,nκ ] 6= 0.
Therefore, in order to prove Lemma 19 we need a commutation property
described in the next lemma.
Let ΠGoodmκ,nκ be the projection operator on to Goodmκ,nκ. The following
holds.
Lemma 20. For every m,n ∈ N and m > n,
[ΠGoodmκ,nκ ,ΠSymmκ ] = 0,
where ΠSymmκ is the projection onto the symmetric subspace over mκ regis-
ters (see notations in Section 2.1).
The proof is given on p. 33.
From now onwards, we fix an arbitrary m,n ∈ N and m > n. Recall
Π
G˜ood
mκ,nκ , the projection operator on to G˜ood
mκ,nκ
(see Eq. (9) for the
definition of G˜ood
mκ,nκ
). Define, the operator Pm,n as follows:
Pm,n := ΠG˜oodmκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ , (11)
where ΠSym(m+1)κ is the projection onto the symmetric subspace over (m+1)κ
registers (see notations in Section 2.1).
Lemma 21. For every m,n ∈ N and m > n, and for every |β〉 ∈ Goodmκ,nκ,
Pr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|β〉) = m] ≤ λmax(Pm,n),
where Pm,n is as defined in Eq. (11).
The proof is given on p. 34. The next lemma estimates the largest
eigenvalue of Pm,n.
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Lemma 22. For every m,n ∈ N and m > n,
λmax(Pm,n) =
(mκ
nκ
)((m+1)κ
(n+1)κ
) ,
where Pm,n is as defined in Eq. (11).
Note the the r.h.s in the lemma above is equal to the success probability
of the attack described in Algorithm 2, see Eq. (8) and the discussion below
it regarding how this term should be interpreted (essentially, it can be close
to 1 even for m = n + 1 and polynomial n, and converges to 1 in the large
n limit). The proof is given on p. 34.
Next, we will see a proof of Proposition 17 using Lemmas 18 to 22.
Proof of Proposition 17. We assume that a QPT adversary A receives n
public coins from the bank. Of course, the bank generates these coins using
Pk-QC.mint in Algorithm 1 (recall that by construction, the state is the
same as nκ private coins). It submits m alleged public coins, which is
a κm-register state which we denote be |α〉 (it would become clear that
the assumption that the submitted state is a pure state is WLOG later).
Since the verifier’s wallet is initialized with one fresh public coin, |¢〉 (see
Pk-QC.Count in Line 22 in Algorithm 1), the total state of the wallet and
the m alleged new coins submitted by the adversary should be
|α˜〉 := |¢〉 ⊗ |α〉.
Express |α〉 as (a1|α1〉+ a2|α2〉) such that
|α1〉 ∈ Goodmκ,nκ, |α2〉 ∈ Badmκ,nκ and
2∑
i=1
|ai|2 = 1.
see Eq. (9) for the definition of Goodmκ,nκ. By Lemma 18,
Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |α〉) > nκ] = |a2|2.
Therefore by the nonadaptive unforgeability (see Definition 9) of the un-
derlying Pr-QC scheme (the private coin scheme that we lift to Pk-QC in
Algorithm 1), there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that
Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |α〉) > nκ] = |a2|2 = negl(λ) . (12)
Note that if the underlying Pr-QC scheme is nonadaptive-unconditionally-
unforgeable (see Definition 9 and Definition 10), then Eq. (12) holds even if
A is computationally unbounded. Let |α˜1〉 := |¢〉⊗ |α1〉 and similarly define
|α˜2〉. Hence,
|α˜〉 = |¢〉 ⊗ |α〉 = |¢〉 ⊗ (a1|α1〉+ a2|α2〉) = a1|α˜1〉+ a2|α˜2〉.
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By definition,
|α˜1〉 ∈ G˜ood
mκ,nκ
, |α˜2〉 ∈ B˜admκ,nκ. (13)
Therefore,
Π
B˜ad
mκ,nκ(ΠSymmκ |α˜1〉)
= Π
B˜ad
mκ,nκΠSymmκΠG˜oodmκ,nκ |α˜1〉
= 0. By Lemma 19
Hence,
ΠSymmκ |α˜1〉 ∈ (B˜admκ,nκ)⊥.
Since |α˜2〉 ∈ B˜admκ,nκ (see Eq. (13)), the states ΠSymmκ |α˜1〉 and |α˜2〉 are
mutually orthogonal and hence, the following holds:
Tr(ΠSym(m+1)κ |α˜2〉〈α˜1|) = Tr(ΠSym(m+1)κ |α˜1〉〈α˜2|) = 〈α˜2|ΠSym(m+1)κ |α˜1〉 = 0.
(14)
The symmetric subspace over (m+ 1)κ registers is the subspace over all
(m+ 1)κ-register pure states which are invariant under any permutation of
the registers. Clearly, any state in the symmetric subspace over (m + 1)κ
register must remain invariant under an arbitrary permutation of the last
mκ registers (keeping the first κ registers intact) since any permutation on
the last mκ registers is also a permutation of the entire (m + 1)κ (which
does nothing to the first κ registers). Therefore, the symmetric subspace
over (m + 1)κ register is a subspace of the symmetric subspace over mκ
registers, i.e.,
Sym(m+1)κ ⊂ H⊗κ ⊗ Symmκ. (15)
Hence, for any state |ψ〉,
Pr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|ψ〉)) = m] (16)
= Tr
(
ΠSym(m+1)κ(ΠSymmκ ⊗ Iκ) · · · (ΠSym2κ ⊗ I(m−1)κ)|¢⊗ ψ〉〈¢⊗ ψ|
)
= Tr(ΠSym(m+1)κ |¢⊗ ψ〉〈¢⊗ ψ|).
Therefore, the success probability of A, i.e., the probability that all m
coins pass verification is:
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Pr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|α〉)) = m]
= Tr(ΠSym(m+1)κ |α˜〉〈α˜|) By Eq. (16)
= Tr(ΠSym(m+1)κ(|a1|2|α˜1〉〈α˜1|) + |a2|2|α˜2〉〈α˜2|)
+ΠSym(m+1)κ(a1a¯2|α˜1〉〈α˜2|) + a2a¯1|α˜2〉〈α˜2|))
= |a1|2 Tr(ΠSym(m+1)κ(|α˜1〉〈α˜1|)
+|a2|2 Tr(ΠSym(m+1)κ(|α˜2〉〈α˜2|) + 0 By Eq. (14)
≤ Tr(ΠSym(m+1)κ(|α˜1〉〈α˜1|) + |a2|2
= Pr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|α1〉)) = m] + |a2|2 By Eq. (16)
= Pr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|α1〉)) = m] + negl(λ) By Eq. (12)
≤ λmax(Pm,n) + negl(λ) (By Lemma 21
since |α2〉 ∈ Goodmκ,nκ)
=
(mκ
nκ
)((m+1)κ
(n+1)κ
) + negl(λ) By Lemma 22
= Pr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉) = m]
+ negl(λ) , By Eq. (8)
where negl(λ) is the negligible function, used in Eq. (12).
Note that |Symmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉 is the same as the state submitted in
Algorithm 2 and hence, we are done with the proof for the case in which
the adversary submits a pure state. The proof can be easily extended to the
general case when A submits a mixed state using a standard convexity argu-
ment. By the nonadaptive unforgeability (see Definition 9) of the underlying
Pr-QC scheme (the private scheme that we lift to Pk-QC in Algorithm 1),
the ensemble submitted by the adversary must have overwhelming overlap
with Goodmκ,nκ. Note that, every ensemble or a mixed state is a convex
combination of pure states. Therefore, up to some negligible correction, the
optimal success probability for the submitted mixed state to pass verifica-
tion for all m coins, is bounded by bounded by λmax(Pm,n), by Lemma 21).
This along with Lemma 22 concludes the proof for the first statement of the
proposition.
We now prove the “Moreover” part of the proposition. The only place in
the proof where we might need computational assumptions on A is Eq. (12)
depending on whether the underlying Pr-QC scheme is nonadaptive-unforgeable
(see Definition 9) only against QPT adversaries or computationally un-
bounded adversaries. Hence, if the underlying Pr-QC scheme is nonadaptive-
unconditionally-unforgeable (see Definition 9 and Definition 10) then the at-
tack described in Algorithm 2 will be optimal even for computationally un-
bounded nonadaptive adversaries as well, who get n public coins from the
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mint and submit m alleged public coins (m,n ∈ poly(λ) and m > n).

Finally, we will see proofs of Lemmas 18 to 22 which completes the proof
of Proposition 17 and our discussion regarding optimal n to m nonadaptive
attacks (m,n ∈ poly(λ) andm > n) on the scheme described in Algorithm 1.
Proof of Lemma 18. Since Pr-QC.verify is a projective measurement
{| 〉〈 |, I − | 〉〈 |},
and Goodmκ,nκ is as defined in Eq. (9),
Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |ψ〉〈ψ|) ≤ nκ] = 〈ψ|ΠGoodmκ,nκ |ψ〉.
where ΠGoodmκ,nκ is the projection on to the subspace Goodmκ,nκ. Hence,
Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |ψ〉〈ψ|) > nκ] (17)
= 1− Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |ψ〉〈ψ|) ≤ nκ]
= 〈ψ|(I −ΠGoodmκ,nκ)|ψ〉
= 〈ψ|Π(Goodmκ,nκ)⊥ |ψ〉
= 〈ψ|ΠBadmκ,nκ |ψ〉.
where ΠBadmκ,nκ is the projection on to the subspace Badmκ,nκ. Hence, for
any |ψ〉 ∈ (H)mκ,
|ψ〉 ∈ Badmκ,nκ ⇐⇒ Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |ψ〉〈ψ|) > nκ] = 1.
Therefore,
Badmκ,nκ = {|ψ〉 ∈ (H)mκ|Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |ψ〉〈ψ|) > nκ] = 1}.
Moreover, for any mκ register state |α〉 := a1|α1〉+ a2|α2〉 such that |α1〉 ∈
Goodmκ,nκ and |α2〉 ∈ Badmκ,nκ,
Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |α〉) > nκ] = 〈α|ΠBadmκ,nκ |α〉 (By Eq. (17))
= |a2|2.

Proof of Lemma 19. By Eq. (10) for every m,n ∈ N and m > n,
Π
G˜ood
mκ,nκ = ΠGood(m+1)κ,(n+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ . (18)
By Lemma 18, we know that
Badmκ,nκ = {|ψ〉 ∈ (H)mκ|Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |ψ〉〈ψ|) > nκ] = 1}.
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Therefore by the definition of B˜admκ,nκ,
B˜ad
mκ,nκ ⊂ {|ψ〉 ∈ (H)(m+1)κ|Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |ψ〉〈ψ|) > (n+ 1)κ] = 1}.
Hence, by Lemma 18,
B˜ad
mκ,nκ ⊂ Bad(m+1)κ,(n+1)κ.
Therefore,
Π
B˜ad
mκ,nκΠGood(m+1)κ,(n+1)κ = ΠB˜admκ,nκΠ(Bad(m+1)κ,(n+1)κ)⊥ = 0. (19)
The rest of the proof follows by combining Eqs. (18) and (19) with Lemma 20.
Π
B˜ad
mκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ
= Π
B˜ad
mκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠGood(m+1)κ,(n+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ By Eq. (18)
= Π
B˜ad
mκ,nκΠGood(m+1)κ,(n+1)κΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ By Lemma 20
= 0. By Eq. (19)

Proof of Lemma 20. For every m, recall the basis Symmκ (see Eq. (3) in
Section 2.1) for the symmetric subspace Symmκ. Therefore,
ΠSymmκ =
∑
~j∈Id,mκ
|Symmκ~j 〉〈Symmκ~j |.
Recall Eq. (2),
|Symmκ〉~j =
1√(mκ
~j
) ∑
~i:T (~i)=~j
|φi1 . . . φimκ〉.
Moreover the set,
{
mκ⊗
k=1
|φik〉}(i1,...imκ)∈(Zd)mκ,(T (~i))0≤nκ,
forms as an orthonormal basis for Goodmκ,nκ for every m,nN and m > n
(see Item 6 in Section 2.1). Hence,
ΠGoodmκ,nκ =
∑
~i∈(Zd)mκ
(T (~i))0≤nκ
mκ⊗
k=1
|φik〉〈φik |.
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Therefore,
ΠSymmκΠGoodmκ,nκ
= ΠSymmκ

∑
~i∈(Zd)mκ
(T (~i))0≤nκ
mκ⊗
k=1
|φik〉〈φik |

= 1√(mκ
T (~i)
) ∑
~i∈(Zd)mκ
(T (~i))0≤nκ
|Symmκ
T (~i)〉〈φi1 . . . φimκ |
=
∑
~i,~r∈(Zd)mκ
T (~i)=T (~r)
(T (~i))0=(T (~r))0≤nκ
1(mκ
T (~i)
) |φr1 . . . φrmκ〉〈φi1 . . . φimκ |
= 1√(mκ
T (~r)
) ∑
~r∈(Zd)mκ
(T (~r))0≤nκ
|φr1 . . . φrmκ〉〈SymmκT (~r)|
= ΠGoodmκ,nκ
 ∑
~j∈Id,mκ
|Symmκ~j 〉〈Symmκ~j |

= ΠGoodmκ,nκΠSymmκ .
This concludes the proof.

Proof of Lemma 21. Fixm,n ∈ N such thatm > n. Let the state submitted
for Pk-QC.Count|¢〉() operation be |β〉 ∈ Goodmκ,nκ. The state of the veri-
fier’s wallet along with the the new registers just before the Pk-QC.Count|¢〉()
operation involving symmetric subspace measurement (see Line 22 in Algo-
rithm 1) is |β˜〉 := |¢〉 ⊗ |β〉 ∈ G˜oodmκ,nκ. Therefore,
Pr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|β〉) = m] = 〈β˜|ΠSym(m+1)κ |β˜〉
= 〈β˜|Π†
G˜ood
mκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ |β˜〉 (since |β〉 ∈ G˜ood
mκ,nκ
)
= 〈β˜|Π
G˜ood
mκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ |β˜〉
≤ λmax(Pm,n). (see Eq. (11))

Proof of Lemma 22. Fix m,n ∈ N such that m > n. In order to estimate
λmax(Pm,n) we will find a set of orthonormal eigenvectors with non-zero
eigenvalues, such that the vectors span ker(Pm,n)⊥, the subspace where Pm,n
acts non-trivially (where Pm,n is as defined in Eq. (11)).
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Let the sets GoodSymmκ,nκ and ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
be defined as:
GoodSymmκ,nκ := {|Symmκ~j 〉}~j∈Id,mκ:j0≤nκ, (20)
˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
:= {|S˜ymmκ~j 〉}~j∈Id,mκ:j0≤nκ.
For the definitions of Id,mκ, |Symmκ~j 〉 and |S˜ym
mκ
~j 〉, see Notations Eq. (2)
and Eq. (3) in Section 2.1. Clearly, GoodSymmκ,nκ is a subset of the ba-
sis, Symmκ (see Section 2.1) and hence, is an orthogonal set. Therefore,
˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
is also an orthogonal set.
We will prove the lemma by proving these parts:
1. ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
spans ker(Pm,n)⊥. Hence, Span( ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
)⊥ ⊂
ker(Pm,n).
2. ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
is a set of orthogonal eigenvectors of Pm,n with positive
eigenvalues.
3. |S˜ymmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉 ∈ ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
has the largest eigenvalue,
λmax(Pm,n), which is equal to (
mκ
nκ)
((m+1)κ(n+1)κ)
.
Note that Item 3 proves the lemma.
Item 1: Observe that, for every |Symmκ~j 〉 ∈ Symmκ,
Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |Symmκ~j 〉) = j0] = 1.
Hence, by definition, GoodSymmκ,nκ (see definition in Eq. (20)) is the subset
of those vectors from the basis Symmκ, which are in Goodmκ,nκ (see definition
of Goodmκ,nκ in Eq. (9) and GoodSymmκ,nκ in Eq. (20)). Moreover, for every
|Symmκ~j 〉 ∈ Symmκ \GoodSymmκ,nκ,
|Symmκ~j 〉 ∈ {|ψ〉 ∈ H⊗mκ | Pr[Pr-QC.Count(sk, |ψ〉) > nκ] = 1}.
Therefore by Lemma 18,
|Symmκ~j 〉 ∈ Badmκ,nκ = (Goodmκ,nκ)⊥.
ThereforeGoodSymmκ,nκ forms an orthonormal basis for Goodmκ,nκ⋂Symmκ =:
GoodSymmκ,nκ. Hence, ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
forms an orthonormal basis for the
subspace ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
defined as
˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
:= {|¢〉 ⊗ |β〉 | |β〉 ∈ GoodSymmκ,nκ} (21)
= G˜ood
mκ,nκ⋂(
H⊗κ ⊗ Symmκ) ,
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where G˜ood
mκ,nκ
is as defined in Eq. (9). Essentially, GoodSymmκ,nκ is the
subspace of all symmetric states in Goodmκ,nκ (see the discussion below
Eq. (9) to interpret Goodmκ,nκ) and ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
is the subspace consisting
of all (m + 1)κ states such that the quantum state of the first κ register is
|¢〉 and the state of the rest mκ registers is a symmetric state in Goodmκ,nκ.
Therefore, it is enough (for Item 1) to show that,
kerPm,n⊥ ⊂ ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
.
As discussed earlier in the proof of Proposition 17 (see Eq. (15)), the
symmetric subspace over (m + 1)κ register is a subspace of the symmetric
subspace over mκ registers, i.e.,
Sym(m+1)κ ⊂ H⊗κ ⊗ (Symmκ.
Hence,
ΠSym(m+1)κΠH⊗κ⊗Symmκ = ΠSym(m+1)κ , (22)
where ΠH⊗κ⊗Symmκ is the projection on to the subspace, H⊗κ⊗Symmκ. Note
that the following commutation property holds,
ΠH⊗κ⊗Symmκ ·ΠG˜oodmκ,nκ
= Iκ ⊗ΠSymmκ · (|¢〉〈¢| ⊗ΠGoodmκ,nκ) by definition of G˜ood
mκ,nκ
, see Eq. (9)
= (Iκ · |¢〉〈¢|)⊗ (ΠSymmκ ·ΠGoodmκ,nκ)
= (|¢〉〈¢| · Iκ)⊗ (ΠGoodmκ,nκ ·ΠSymmκ) by Lemma 20
= Π
G˜ood
mκ,nκ ·ΠH⊗κ⊗Symmκ (23)
Therefore,
Pm,n = ΠG˜oodmκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ
= Π
G˜ood
mκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠH⊗κ⊗SymmκΠG˜oodmκ,nκ by Eq. (22)
= Π
G˜ood
mκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκΠH⊗κ⊗Symmκ . by Eq. (23).
Hence, (H⊗κ ⊗ Symmκ)⊥ ⊂ ker(Pm,n) which is equivalent to
ker(Pm,n)⊥ ⊂ H⊗κ ⊗ Symmκ.
Similarly, since, Pm,n = ΠG˜oodmκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ , ker(Pm,n)
⊥ ⊂ G˜oodmκ,nκ.
Therefore, by the above two arguments,
ker(Pm,n)⊥ ⊂ G˜ood
mκ,nκ⋂(
H⊗κ ⊗ Symmκ)
= ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
. by Eq. (21)
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Item 2: Now, we will show that ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
is a set of orthogonal
eigenvectors for Pm,n with positive eigenvalues.
∀~j ∈ Id,mκ : j0 ≤ nκ,
Pm,n|S˜ym
mκ
~j 〉 = ΠG˜oodmκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ |S˜ym
mκ
~j 〉 (24)
= Π
G˜ood
mκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κ |S˜ym
mκ
~j 〉
=
√√√√√
(mκ
~j
)
( (m+1)κ
(j0+κ,j1,...,jd−1)
)ΠG˜oodmκ,nκ |Sym(m+1)κ(j0+κ,j1...jd−1)〉
=
(mκ
~j
)
( (m+1)κ
(j0+κ,j1,...,jd−1)
) |S˜ymmκ~j 〉.
Therefore, |S˜ymmκ(j0...jd−1)〉 is an eigenvector with eigenvalue(mκ
~j
)
( (m+1)κ
(j0+κ,j1,...,jd−1)
) ∀~j ∈ Id,mκ : j0 ≤ nκ.
Item 3: Item 1 shows that all non-zero eigenvalues of Pm,n must be in
Span( ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
). Clearly, Pm,n is positive semidefinite by definition.
Therefore, λmax(Pm,n) is attained in ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
, i.e., λmax(Pm,n) is the
eigenvalue for some eigenvector in ˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
. By Item 2, for every
~j ∈ Id,mκ the term for the corresponding eigenvalue is
=
(mκ
~j
)
( (m+1)κ
(j0+κ,j1,...,jd−1)
)
=
(mκ
j0
)( mκ−j0
(j1,j2,...jd−1)
)
((m+1)κ
κ+j0
)( mκ−j0
(j1,j2,...jd−1)
)
=
( mκ
mκ−j0
)
((m+1)κ
mκ−j0
)
=
κ∏
r=1
j0 + r
mκ+ r .
Hence, the term for the eigenvalue increases with increasing j0 and is inde-
pendent of j1, j2, . . . jd−1. Since, j0 ≤ nκ, the maximum value is attained by
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all the vectors ~j in Id,mκ such that j0 = nκ. Therefore, |S˜ym
mκ
(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉
is one of the largest eigenvectors. Hence,
λmax(Pm,n) =
(mκ
nκ
)((m+1)κ
(n+1)κ
) , the eigenvalue for |S˜ymmκ(nκ,(m−n)κ,0...,0)〉. 
5 Security proofs
In this subsection we use Proposition 17 to prove our lifting result, Propo-
sition 13.
Proof of Proposition 13. Let A be an arbitrary adversary (QPT or com-
putationally unbounded depending on the unforgeability guarantees of the
underlying Pr-QC scheme). As discussed in the unforgeability experiment
(see Experiment 1), we denote n to be the number of coins, the adversary A
receives and m be the number of coins it submits such that m,n ∈ poly(λ)
and m > n.
According to our definition of the utility function (see Eq. (4)) with
respect to Experiment 1, either the verification is successful and the verifier
accepts all the m coins, in which case the utility U(A) of the adversary A
is (m− n). Otherwise, the verifier rejects and A’s utility is (−n).
Since the underlying Pr-QC scheme is nonadaptive-unforgeable (see Def-
inition 9), by Proposition 17, the success probability of A, i.e., all the m
coins are accepted, is less than or equal to
negl(λ) +
(mκ
nκ
)((m+1)κ
(n+1)κ
) ,
for some negligible function negl(λ). As discussed before, if the underly-
ing Pr-QC scheme is nonadaptive-unconditionally-unforgeable (see Definition 9
and Definition 10), then this holds for any computationally unbounded ad-
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versary. Therefore, the expected utility of the adversary A
E(U(A)) (25)
≤ negl(λ) +
(mκ
nκ
)((m+1)κ
(n+1)κ
) .(m− n) + (1− (mκnκ)((m+1)κ
(n+1)κ
))(−n)
= m
(mκ
nκ
)((m+1)κ
(n+1)κ
) − n+ negl(λ)
≤ m
(
n+ 1
m+ 1
)κ
− n+ negl(λ)
= m(n+ 1)
κ − n(m+ 1)κ
(m+ 1)κ + negl(λ)
≤ m− n(m+ 1)κ + negl(λ) m ≥ n.
≤ 1(m+ 1)κ−1 + negl(λ)
≤ 12κ−1 + negl(λ) since m ≥ 1.
= 1
2logc(λ)−1
+ negl(λ) since κ = (log(λ))c, c > 1.
= 2
λlog
c−1(λ) + negl(λ)
= negl′(λ) since c > 1.
Hence, if the underlying Pr-QC scheme is nonadaptive-unforgeable (see Def-
inition 9) then the Pk-QC scheme is nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable (see
Definition 8). Moreover, if the underlying Pr-QC scheme is nonadaptive-
unconditionally-unforgeable (see Definition 9 and Definition 10), then Pk-QC
is unconditionally nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable (see Definition 8 and
Definition 10). Note that this holds even if the underlying Pr-QC scheme is
inefficient. 
6 Discussion and future Work
The most pressing issue is to understand whether our scheme, or maybe
others, achieves stronger security notion. In Proposition 13, we proved that
our scheme is nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable (see Definition 8), provided
that the underlying private money scheme is nonadaptive-unforgeable (see
Definition 9). However, we do not know if the scheme is secure in stronger
adversarial models.
39
Open Problem 23. Is there any public quantum coin scheme which is
rationally-unforgeable in the adaptive sense? Is our scheme Pk-QC (see Al-
gorithm 1) rationally unforgeable in the adaptive sense, provided the the
underlying private scheme, Pr-QC is unforgeable in the adaptive sense?
We know that Wiesner’s scheme is nonadaptive-unforgeable (see Defini-
tion 9). In the adaptive setting, it is secure only if the bank never returns
the money state after verification [PYJ+12] but it is insecure otherwise –
see [Lut10, Aar09] and [NSBU16].
A positive answer to open problem 23 would remove some of the restric-
tions in the user manual (see Section 3.1), thereby reaching a step closer to
constructing a truly public quantum coin scheme.
In Theorem 11, we already proved the existence of an inefficient public
money scheme with comparison-based verification that achieves some sense
of unforgeability against unbounded adversaries. This provides the moti-
vation for the following research direction. Consider the following private
coin scheme: key-gen(λ) generates the secret key, a random quantum circuit
C with poly(λ) many qudits and depth. The mint prepares the quantum
state |¢〉 = C|0 . . . 0〉. An (alleged) coin | 〉 is then run through the circuit
C† by verify, which then measures all the qudits in the computational basis.
The coin is accepted as valid if and only if all the measurement outcomes
are 0. Clearly, the scheme has perfect completeness. It is known that |¢〉
in this construction is a polynomial-design [BHH16] – which is a pseudo-
random property which essentially guarantees that for some polynomial P
(where P depends on the depends on the depth of the circuit C), the state
|¢〉p cannot be distinguished from |ψ〉⊗P , where |ψ〉 is a Haar-uniform state.
We briefly mention that this construction was used in a related context –
namely, quantum copy protection [Aar09]. In [AMR19], the authors show a
stateful construction of an efficient private coin scheme which is nonadaptive-
unconditionally-unforgeable (see Definition 9 and Definition 10) by a stateful
approximation of polynomial-design. We are not aware of a stateless ana-
logue of such a scheme.
Open Problem 24. Is there an (stateless) efficient nonadaptive-unconditionally-
-unforgeable (see Definition 9 and Definition 10) private quantum coin scheme?
Is the scheme in the preceding paragraph such a scheme?
The proof of Proposition 13 can be easily adapted so that a positive
answer to Open Problem 24 above implies that there exists a comparison-
based almost public coin scheme that is unconditionally nonadaptive-rational-
ly-unforgeable (see Definition 8 and Definition 10).
Lastly, the added guarantees of untraceability that quantum coins pro-
vide could be relevant to other related notions in quantum cryptography,
such as, quantum copy-protection [Aar09], quantum tokens for digital sig-
natures [BS16], and disposable backdoors [CGLZ19].
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A Nomenclature
A˜ Subspace of n+ κ register states such that the state of first
κ registers is |¢〉 and the state of the last mκ registers is
some state in A, for any subspace A ⊂ Hn, page 11
A⊥ the orthogonal subspace of A, for any subspace A, page 12
Badmκ,nκ (Goodmκ,nκ)⊥, page 26
B˜ad
mκ,nκ Subspace of mκ registers such that the state of the first κ
registers is |¢〉 and the state of the last mκ registers is some
state in Badmκ,nκ, page 26
|¢〉 A public coin equivalent to κ private coins., page 13
Count(j,n) Hamiltonian counting whether the jth register is | 〉 = |φ0〉,
page 56
Countn hamiltonian implementing Pr-QC.Count,
∑
j∈[n] Count(j,n),
page 56
GoodSymmκ,nκ vectors in Symmκ, which are in the subspace Goodmκ,nκ,
page 35
˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
set of (m+1)κ register states obtained by tensoring |¢〉 with
every vector in GoodSymmκ,nκ, page 35
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Goodmκ,nκ Subspace of mκ registers states on which Pr-QC.Count is
≤ nκ with probability 1, page 26
GoodSymmκ,nκ intersection of the symmetric subspace Symmκ with Goodmκ,nκ,
page 35
˜GoodSym
mκ,nκ
subspace of (m+ 1)κ register states such that the quantum
state of the first κ registers is |¢〉 and the state of the rest
mκ register is a vector in GoodSymmκ,nκ, page 35
G˜ood
mκ,nκ
Subspace of (κ+mκ) register states such that the quantum
state of the first κ registers is |¢〉 and the state of the rest
mκ register is a vector in Goodmκ,nκ, page 26
H˜mκ Subspace of (m + 1)κ register states such that the state of
first κ registers is |¢〉 and the state of the last mκ registers
is some state in H⊗mκ, page 56
H Cd, page 9
Im(T ) the image of T , for any linear operator T , page 12
Id,n Set of all vectors in (j0, j1, . . . , jd−1) such that
∑d−1
k=0 jk = n,
page 10
ker(T ) kernel of T , for any linear operator T , page 12
λmax(H) largest eigenvalue ofH for any Hermitian operatorH, page 11(n
~j
) ( n
j0,j1,...jd−1
)
, page 10
| 〉 a private coin, page 13
ω state of wallet in general, possible after a verification involv-
ing symmetric subspace measurement, page 18
ω˜ combined state of the wallet and the new alleged coins re-
ceived for verification using the wallet, page 18
ΠA projection onto A, for any subspace A, page 12
ΠBadmκ,nκ projection on to the subspace Badmκ,nκ, page 32
Π
B˜ad
mκ,nκ Projection on to B˜admκ,nκ, page 27
ΠGoodmκ,nκ projection on to Goodmκ,nκ, page 28
ΠGoodmκ,nκ projection on to the subspace Goodmκ,nκ, page 32
Π
G˜ood
mκ,nκ projection on to G˜ood
mκ,nκ
, page 27
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Π
H˜mκ
projection on to H˜mκ, page 56
ΠH⊗κ⊗Symmκ projection on to H⊗κ ⊗ Symmκ, page 36
ΠSymn projection operator on to Symn, page 10
Pm,n ΠG˜oodmκ,nκΠSym(m+1)κΠG˜oodmκ,nκ , page 28
Permn(pi) for every permutation pi of n registers, it is the permutation
operator ∑~i∈Zn
d
|φpi−1(i1) . . . φpi−1(in)〉〈φi1 , . . . φin |, (same as
Pd(pi) in the notation of [Har13]), page 56
Q mΠSym(m+1)κ − 1κCount(m+1)κ + I(m+1)κ, page 58
QPA Quantum Poly-time Algorithm, page 15
QPT Quantum Polynomial Time, page 11
Symn orthonormal basis for Symn denoted by {|Symn(j0,...,jd−1)〉}~j∈Id,n ,
page 10
S˜ym
n
orthonormal basis for the subspace S˜ym
n
denoted by {|Symn(j0,...,jd−1)〉}~j∈Id,n ,
page 10
|Symn~j 〉
1√
(n~j)
∑
~i:T (~i)=~j |φi1 . . . φin〉, page 10
|S˜ymn~j 〉 |¢〉 ⊗ |Symn~j 〉, page 10
Symn the symmetric subspace of H over n registers, page 10
Sn Symmetric group over n objects, page 56
Span(S) the subspace spanned by S, page 12
Tr(ρ) trace of the matrix ρ, for any matrix ρ, page 12
T (~i) vector in Id,n whose kth entry (for k ∈ Zd) is the number of
times k appears in the vector ~i, page 10
B Other results and possible attacks
B.1 Other results for our construction
In this section we will see that our scheme, Pk-QC satisfies some additional
properties.
In the context of money, we should also consider attacks which are in-
tended to hurt honest users rather than forging money. For example - sup-
pose an adversary who starts with one fresh coin, gives you a coin which you
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accepted after successful verification, but later when you send this money
to somebody else, it does not pass verification. Note that, the adversary did
not manage to forge money, but was able to sabotage the honest user. Such
attacks are called sabotage attacks (as discussed in [BS16]).
In public key quantum money schemes, usually unforgeability ensures
that the users do not get cheated. However in case of quantum money
scheme with comparison-based verification this implication is not very clear.
Since the verification involves the quantum coins of the user’s wallet, it is
essential that the honest users (money receivers) do not end up having less
valid money than what they should have had, due to transactions with
adversarial merchants. For example - suppose an adversary starts with
one fresh coin, and gives you a coin. You accept it after successful public
verification using a wallet, which initially had one true coin. Later, you
send both these money states (the one received and the one initially had)
to somebody else, but only one of the two coins passes verification.
We first define the notion of security against sabotage for a standard
public-key quantum money with a classical public key.
nonadaptive-secure-against-sabotageA,Mλ :
1 : sk ← key-gen(1λ)
2 : ρ ≡ (ρ1, . . . , ρm) ρi can be potentially entangled←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Amint(sk),verification-key-gen(sk)(1λ)
3 : m′ ← Count(ρ)
4 : Denote ω be the state of the wallet after receiving the coins
5 : refund← Count(ω)
6 : Experiment output is 1 if and only if m′ > refund.
Experiment 2: Nonadaptive Security against sabotage
Definition 25. A money scheme M is called nonadaptive-secure-against-
sabotage, if for every QPT A, there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such
that
Pr(nonadaptive-secure-against-sabotageA,Mλ = 1) ≤ negl(λ) .
For a comparison-based public quantum money scheme with private ver-
ification (see Definitions 5 and 6), the definition mentioned above is not
enough, due to the following reasons. Since the public count operation in a
comparison based quantum money involves the previous coins of the veri-
fier, the definition of security against sabotage should ensure that the honest
verifiers do not lose their net worth (including the previous money). Note
that in our construction Pk-QC (see Algorithm 1), the wallet is initialized
with one fresh coin, and then the wallet is used the Pk-QC.Count operation,
see Line 22 in Algorithm 1.
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In a public-key comparison based quantum money with private verifi-
cation, the refund can also be calculated using the private count, which
might be able to determine the net worth of the users, in a meaningful way.
In our context, it is indeed possible to define nonadaptive rational security
against sabotage, using the private count for refund, but we do not know if
our scheme Pk-QC is secure with respect to such a definition. However, by
altering this definition slightly, and allowing fractional refunds, the scheme
Pk-QC can be proven to be secure against sabotage. In the alternate def-
inition, the refund is calculated using a slightly different count operation,
which is close but not the same as the private count (see Section 3.1). We
call this count function as Counttotal.The algorithm Counttotal, unlike the
usual other count functions, can attain fractional values as well. For public
coins schemes such as ours, where each public coin is made up of mini coins,
Counttotal counts the total number of valid mini coins, present in a given
public coin or group of coins, and outputs the amount (possible fractional
value) of public coins that can be carved out of it. For example, if a coin
is made up of two mini coins, then running Counttotal on a quantum state
containing three mini coins, should output one and a half. For our scheme
Pk-QC in Algorithm 1, we add an algorithm Counttotal as follows: This is the
51: procedure Counttotal(sk, ρ) . Continued from Algorithm 1
52: Output: Pr-QC.Count(ρ)/κ.
53: end procedure
motivation for using fractional refunds in the user manual (see Section 3.1).
The bank refund in the user manual is the same as Counttotal. Moreover,
as in the non-adaptive rational unforgeability definition (see Definition 8),
we consider a non-standard nonadaptive setting in the altered definition.
We either approve all the coins or no coins. We do not know if the gen-
eral definition nonadaptive definition holds for our scheme. Also, we require
security against sabotage in the rational sense, since the usual and stricter
sense of security against sabotage does not hold for our scheme, Pk-QC. The
attack described in Algorithm 2 can also be seen as a sabotage attack. Our
scheme is nonadaptive-rationally-secure-against-sabotage with respect to such
an altered definition.
This motivates us to define the nonadaptive rational security against
sabotage for a comparison based public quantum money with private verifi-
cation as follows:
With respect to Experiment 3, we define the following quantities.
L(A) =
{
m+ 1− refund, if m = m′,
1− refund, otherwise. (26)
We shall refer to L(A) as the loss of the honest verifier due to A.
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nonadaptive-rationally-secure-against-sabotageA,Mλ :
1 : sk ← key-gen(1λ)
2 : ρ ≡ (ρ1, . . . , ρm) ρi can be potentially entangled←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Amint(sk),verification-key-gen(sk)(1λ)
3 : m′ ← Count(ρ) . Here we use the public Count.
4 : Denote ω be the state of the wallet after receiving the coins
5 : refund← Counttotal(ω)
6 : Output: m′, refund.
Experiment 3: Nonadaptive Security against sabotage
Definition 26 (Rational Security against sabotage). A money scheme M
is nonadaptive-rationally-secure-against-sabotage if for every QPA A in Ex-
periment 3, there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that
E(L(A)) ≤ negl(λ) .
Definition 27 (Rational-Security). A money scheme M is nonadaptive-
-rationally-secure if it is both nonadaptive-rationally-secure-against-sabotage
and nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable.
In the user manual (see Section 3.1), the bank can be seen as giving
refunds using Counttotal. Hence, the user manual ensures, that any sabo-
tage attack that results a non-negligible loss on honest users (on expecta-
tion), would imply a violation of Definition 26. Therefore, if a scheme is
nonadaptive-rationally-secure-against-sabotage, then it can be used securely
in the user manual.
Proposition 28. The scheme Pk-QC in Algorithm 1, is unconditionally
nonadaptive-rationally-secure-against-sabotage (see Definition 26), if the un-
derlying Pr-QC.verify(sk, . . .) is a rank-1 projective measurement.
The proof is given in Section B.3 on p. 55.
Combining Proposition 13 and Proposition 28 we get a lifting theorem.
Theorem 29. The public money scheme Pk-QC constructed in 1 is nonadaptive-
-rationally-secure (see Definition 27) if the underlying private quantum money
scheme Pr-QC is nonadaptive-unforgeable (see Definition 9) and Pr-QC.verify
is a rank-1 projective measurement. Moreover if Pr-QC is nonadaptive-
unconditionally-unforgeable (see Definition 10), then the scheme Pk-QC is
also unconditionally (see Definition 10) nonadaptive-rationally-secure (see
Definition 27).
See the proof in Section B.3 on p. 59.
This also shows the main result but without the private-untraceable prop-
erty.
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Corollary 30. If quantum secure one-way functions exist, then also a nonadaptive-
-rationally-secure (see Definition 27) public quantum coin with comparison-
based verification exists. Furthermore, there exists an inefficient public quan-
tum money with a comparison-based verification scheme that is nonadaptive-
rationally-secure (see Definition 27) unconditionally (see Definition 10).
The proof is given in Section B.3 on p. 59.
In our discussion regarding Coins and Bills, we emphasized the fact that
Coins are more secure than Bills in terms of privacy and untraceability. In
Ref. [AMR19], the authors formalized the notion of untraceability. They
defined the following untraceability game.
Algorithm 3 Untraceability game: Untraceλ[M,A]
set up the trace: A(1λ) receives oracle access to mint(sk) and
verification-key-gensk, and outputs registers M0, . . . ,Mn and a permuta-
tion pi ∈ Sn;
permute and verify: b← {0, 1} is sampled at random, and if b = 1 the
states M0, . . . ,Mn are permuted by pi. verify is invoked on each Mj , the
approved registers are placed in a set S11 while the rest are discarded;
complete the trace: A receives S and the secret key sk,12 and output a
guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The output of the game, Untraceλ[M,A] is 1 if and only if b = b′.
Definition 31 (Untraceability of quantum money [AMR19]). A money
scheme M is called untraceable, if for every (even computationally un-
bounded) A, there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that
Pr(UntraceA,Mλ = 1)−
1
2 ≤ negl(λ) .
Notice that a quantum coin scheme is not untraceable by definition. In-
deed, our construction Pk-QC is not untraceable (see Algorithm 5 in Ap-
pendix B.2, if we simply use public verification in the second step of the
untraceability game (Algorithm 3). On the positive side, if we use private
verification, which is rank-1 in our construction (by assumption), the scheme
would be untraceable. This motivates us to define a different untraceability
notion which we call the private-untraceability. This also provides a motiva-
tion for not spending money received in the user manual, and only spending
money received from the bank.
11In [AMR19], they use M to denote the set. Since, we use M to denote the money
scheme, we use S to denote this set instead.
12In [AMR19], the A is given the entire state of the bank. Since, we only consider
stateless money schemes, this is the same as giving the secret key sk.
52
Algorithm 4 Private-untraceability game: Priv-untraceλ[M,A]
set up the trace: Same as in Algorithm 3;
permute and verify: Replace verify with verifybank in Algorithm 3.
complete the trace: Same as in Algorithm 3;
The output of the game, Priv-untraceλ[M,A] is 1 if and only if b = b′.
Definition 32 (Private-untraceability of quantum money [AMR19]). A
money scheme M is called private-untraceable, if for every (even compu-
tationally unbounded) A, there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that
Pr(Priv-untraceM,Aλ = 1)−
1
2 ≤ negl(λ) .
Our scheme is indeed private-untraceable. In the user manual, only
money received from the bank (which returns money after private verifica-
tion), is allowed to be spent. Hence, if a money scheme is private-untraceable,
then the user manual ensures that traceability attack cannot succeed with
non-negligible property.
Proposition 33. The scheme Pk-QC is private-untraceable if the underlying
Pr-QC.verify(sk, . . .) is a rank-1 projective measurement.
The proof is given in Appendix B.3 on p. 59.
B.2 Traceability attack
Our scheme, Pk-QC is not untraceable. In this section, we describe an attack,
described in Algorithm 5, which has a non-negligible success probability in
the untraceability game, described in Algorithm 3.
Analysis of the traceability attack Since the underlying private scheme
Pr-QC is nonadaptive-unforgeable (see Definition 9), the state |1〉, with very
high probability, has negligible overlap with | 〉 and has overwhelming over-
lap with | ⊥〉 = |φ1〉. The state |γ〉 can be constructed in a similar way as
seen in Algorithm 2. The measurement {| ⊥〉〈 ⊥|, (I − | ⊥〉〈 ⊥|)} can be
approximately done by measuring in the basis {|1〉〈1|, (I − |1〉〈1|)} with the
outcome |1〉 corresponding to | ⊥〉.
We assume that the challenger uses separate wallets each initialized to
|¢〉 for verifying |¢〉 and |γ〉.13 Hence as we see in the analysis of the attack
described in Algorithm 2, with probability 12 , the challenger will not discard
the register of γ. Clearly |¢〉 will be accepted with certainty. Hence, the
challenger will accept both the registers and not discard any of them with
probability 12 . If none of the coins are discarded, then the adversary wins
13If the challenger instead uses the same wallet to verify both the coins then the success
probability of the attack can only increase.
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Algorithm 5 Traceable attack on the scheme Pk-QC
Obtain two public coins ¢⊗2 using the Pk-QC.mint(sk).
For one coin, replace one of the κ registers with | ⊥〉 to get the state
| 〉⊗2κ−1 ⊗ | ⊥〉.
Symmetrize to get the state, |γ〉 = 1√
κ
∑2κ
i=1 | 〉 · · · | ⊥〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
· · · | 〉 where
| ⊥〉 = |φ1〉 (see Item 6 in Section 2.1.).
In Algorithm 4, send (|¢〉, |γ〉, (1, 2)) to the challenger where (1, 2) is the
permutation that switches the two registers.
if Both the coins are returned, then
On receiving coins (|α1〉, |α2〉) from the users, apply the two outcome
measurement {| ⊥〉〈 ⊥|, (I − | ⊥〉〈 ⊥|)} on each register of |α1〉.
if any one of the outcomes is | ⊥〉, then
Output b = 1.
else
Output b = 0.
end if
else
Select b ∈ {0, 1} randomly and output.
end if
with overwhelming probability. This is because the adversary will get a
| ⊥〉 on measurement in exactly one of the coins received with overwhelming
probability. Since initially one of the registers of the second coin would have
given | ⊥〉, if on receiving the coins back from the challenger one of the
registers of the first coin gives | ⊥〉, then the two coins must have exchanged
position and hence b = 1. If the challenger discards one of the coins or both
the coins (happens with probability 12), the adversary wins with probability1
2 . Therefore, the success probability of the adversary to win is roughly
(12 · 12 + 12 .1), i.e., 34 and the advantage is roughly 14 . A similar analysis
shows that if the challenger uses n fresh coins instead of 1 fresh coin, then
the advantage of this attack would be roughly 12(n+1) which is a smaller
advantage than 12 .
Note that the attack does not even require or use the sk, that is received
in the end in Algorithm 4. Hence, the adversary can trace without the
help of the bank and therefore, this is a strong attack. However, the attack
described in Algorithm 5, has negligible success probability in the private
untraceability game (Algorithm 4), i.e., traceable attacks can be prevented
in our scheme if users only pay money, received from bank after private
verification. This provides another motivation to have the receive-only re-
strictions in the user manual.
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B.3 Completeness and other proofs
First we give proof for completeness Proposition 12.
Proof of Proposition 12. First, we show that every procedure in our con-
struction (see Algorithm 1) is a QPT. We assume that the underlying Pr-QC
scheme is complete and hence Pr-QC.mint(sk, . . .) is a QPT. Therefore, since
κ ∈ logc(λ) (c > 1), Pk-QC.mint is a QPT. Simlarly Pk-QC.verifybank(sk, . . .)
is a QPT since Pr-QC.verify(sk, . . .) is a QPT. It is known that {ΠSymn , (I −
ΠSymn)} can be implemented efficiently [BBD+97]. Therefore, Pk-QC.verify()
is also a QPT.
We show by induction that (a) the wallet state before the kth verification
of valid money states is |¢〉⊗k and (b) in the kth repeated verification of valid
money, Pr[Pk-QC.verify(|¢〉) = 1] = 1.
Base case (k = 1): By the initialization of the wallet (see Line 10), (a)
is satisfied. Hence, the total state is |¢〉⊗2 = | 〉⊗2κ. Therefore,
Pr[Pk-QC.verify(|¢〉) = 1] = Tr(ΠSym2κ | 〉〈 |⊗2κ) = 1.
Induction step (assume for k and prove for k + 1): (a) The wallet state
before the kth verification is, by assumptions, |¢〉⊗k. In the kth verification,
we verify the state |¢〉, so the new wallet state immediately prior to the
measurement is |¢〉⊗k+1, and since the projection passes with probability 1
(by the induction hypothesis), we know that the wallet state does not change
due to the projection.
(b) By assuming the result which we proved in (a), the new wallet state
is |¢〉⊗k+1, which is invariant under the permutation of its registers. As such,
it lies in the symmetric subspace and will therefore pass verification. Note
that, as per the user manual (see Section 2.1), only one transaction can
be done with a receiving wallet initialized with one fresh coin. The proof
above shows that, if all the coins received in a single transaction are valid
public coins (|¢〉), then they all will be accepted, and the transaction will be
approved with certainty. Since every transaction is verified independently,
using a separate receiving wallet, this is enough to prove completeness. 
Next we turn our attention towards proving rational security against
sabotage of our construction Pk-QC.
Proof of Proposition 28. Let A be any computationally unbounded adver-
sary who submits m public coins in the unforgeability experiment (Exper-
iment 1). WLOG, let the combined state of the m coins be a pure state
|β〉 and let ω be the post measurement state of the wallet ((m + 1) coins).
For mixed states, the proposition easily follows since every mixed state is a
probabilistic ensemble of pure states. Let X be a boolean random variable
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such that
X =
{
1 if Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|β〉〈β|) = m
0 otherwise.
Let Y , Y ′ be random variables such that
Y ′ := Pr-QC.Count(sk, ω)/κ,
Y := Pr-QC.Count(sk, |¢〉〈¢| ⊗ |β〉〈β|)/κ,
where Pr-QC is the private scheme we lift in Algorithm 1.
Let H˜mκ be the subspace defined as H˜mκ := {|¢〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 | |ψ〉 ∈ H⊗mκ}
and Π
H˜mκ
be the projection on to H˜mκ. By the definition of refund (see
Eq. (26), Experiment 3 and Section 3.1),
L(A) = mX + 1− Y ′.
As it name suggests, Pr-QC.Count simply counts how many registers
with quantum state, |¢〉 are present. This is indeed invariant under the
permutation of the registers. We now prove that the symmetric subspace
measurement (Pk-QC.verify) commutes with Pr-QC.Count(sk, . . .). Note that
for any mixed state ρ of (m+ 1)κ registers,
E(Pr-QC.Count(sk, |ψ〉)) = Tr
(
Count(m+1)κρ
)
, (27)
and
ΠSym(m+1)κ =
1
(m+ 1)κ!
∑
pi∈S(m+1)κ
Perm(m+1)κ(pi),
where for every n ∈ N, Countn is defined as
Countn :=
∑
j∈[n]
Count(j,n),
and for every n ∈ N and j ∈ [n], Count(j,n) is defined as
Count(j,n) := I ⊗ | 〉〈 |︸ ︷︷ ︸
j
⊗I,
and for every n ∈ N and every permutation pi ∈ Sn, the projector Permn(pi)
is defined as
Permn(pi) :=
∑
~i∈Zn
d
|φpi−1(i1) . . . φpi−1(in)〉〈φi1 , . . . φin |,
where {|φj〉} is the basis for H defined in Item 6 in Section 2.1. Eq. (27)
follows from the observation that for any mixed state ρ of (m + 1)κ reg-
isters, the probability that the jth register of ρ pass Pr-QC.verify(sk, ) is
Tr(Count(j,n)ρ).
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For pi ∈ S(m+1)κ and j ∈ [(m+ 1)κ],
Perm(m+1)κ(pi)Count(j,(m+1)κ) = Count(pi−1(j),(m+1)κ)(Perm(m+1)κ(pi)).
Hence, for j ∈ [(m+ 1)κ],
ΠSym(m+1)κCount(j,(m+1)κ) = Count(pi−1(j),(m+1)κ)ΠSym(m+1)κ .
Therefore,
ΠSym(m+1)κ
(
Count(m+1)κ
)
=
∑
j∈[(m+1)κ]
ΠSym(m+1)κCount(j,(m+1)κ)
=
∑
j∈[(m+1)κ]
Count(pi−1(j),(m+1)κ)ΠSym(m+1)κ
=
(
Count(m+1)κ
)
ΠSym(m+1)κ .
Therefore, the operator commutes with the projection ΠSym(m+1)κ and hence
with the I −ΠSym(m+1)κ . Using this commutation property, it can be shown
that if ω˜ and ω are the states of the wallet along with m new coins before
and after the symmetric subspace measurement,
Tr
(
Count(m+1)κω
)
= Tr
(
Count(m+1)κ(|¢〉〈¢| ⊗ |β〉〈β|)
)
. (28)
Hence,
E(Y ′) = E(Pr-QC.Count(sk, ω)/κ)
= Tr
(
Count(m+1)κω
)
= Tr
(
Count(m+1)κ(|¢〉〈¢| ⊗ |β〉〈β|)
)
By Eq. (28)
= E(Pr-QC.Count(sk, (|¢〉〈¢| ⊗ |β〉〈β|))/κ) = E(Y ). (29)
The proof crucially uses the commutation property in Eq. (29) that the
private Pr-QC.Count() commutes with the public verification (symmetric
subspace measurement). This is a property of our construction and does
not follow from the definition itself. Hence, the above proposition might fail
to hold in other constructions.
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Therefore,
E(L(A)) = mPr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|¢〉〈¢| ⊗ |β〉〈β|) = m]− E(Y ′) + 1
= mPr[Pk-QC.Count|¢〉(|¢〉〈¢| ⊗ |β〉〈β|) = m]− E(Y ) + 1
= m(〈¢| ⊗ 〈β|ΠSym(m+1)κ |¢〉 ⊗ |β〉)
−〈¢| ⊗ 〈β|1
κ
Count(m+1)κ|¢〉 ⊗ |β〉+ 1
= 〈¢| ⊗ 〈β|(mΠSym(m+1)κ −
1
κ
Count(m+1)κ + I(m+1)κ)|¢〉 ⊗ |β〉
= 〈¢| ⊗ 〈β|Q|¢〉 ⊗ |β〉
= 〈¢| ⊗ 〈β|Π
H˜mκ
QΠ
H˜mκ
|¢〉 ⊗ |β〉 since |¢〉 ⊗ |β〉 ∈ H˜mκ
≤ λmax(ΠH˜mκQΠH˜mκ),
where Q is defined as Q := mΠSym(m+1)κ − 1κCount(m+1)κ + I(m+1)κ.
Hence, it is enough to show that the largest eigenvalue of Π
H˜mκ
QΠ
H˜mκ
is negligible. We now show that the largest eigenvalue of Π
H˜mκ
QΠ
H˜mκ
is
indeed negligible.
Recall the orthogonal set S˜ym
mκ
defined as S˜ym
mκ
=
{
|S˜ymmκ~j 〉
}
~j∈Id,mκ
(see Notations Eq. (3) and Eq. (3) in Section 2.1). By a similar argument
as in the proof of Lemma 22, we can show that(
Span
(
S˜ym
mκ))⊥ ⊂ ker(Π
H˜mκ
ΠSym(m+1)κΠH˜mκ).
Note that Π
H˜mκ
Count(m+1)κΠH˜mκ and ΠH˜mκ have non-negative eigenvalues.
Therefore Π
H˜mκ
QΠ
H˜mκ
, which can be written as
m(Π
H˜mκ
ΠSym(m+1)κΠH˜mκ)− (ΠH˜mκ + ΠH˜mκCount(m+1)κΠH˜mκ),
has all its positive eigenvalues contained in the span of S˜ym
mκ
.
Moreover a simple calculation (similar to what wee did in Eq. (24)
in the proof of Lemma 22) shows that S˜ym
mκ
is a set of eigenvectors of
Π
H˜mκ
ΠSym(m+1)κΠH˜mκ . For every |S˜ym
mκ
~j 〉 ∈ S˜ym
mκ
,
Π
H˜mκ
ΠSym(m+1)κΠH˜mκ(|S˜ym
mκ
~j 〉) =
( mκ
(j0,j1,...,jd−1)
)
( (m+1)κ
(j0+κ,j1,...,jd−1)
)(|S˜ymmκ~j 〉).
Clearly, S˜ym
mκ
forms a set of eigenvectors for Π
H˜mκ
as well as for
Count(m+1)κ. Hence, S˜ym
mκ
is a set of eigenvectors of Π
H˜mκ
QΠ
H˜mκ
. Since
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S˜ym
mκ
spans the positive eigenvalues of Π
H˜mκ
QΠ
H˜mκ
, its maximum eigen-
value is contained in S˜ym
mκ
(We need not care about the negative eigen-
values). A further investigation shows that for every |S˜ymmκ~j 〉 ∈ S˜ym
mκ
,
the corresponding eigenvalue is
m ·
( mκ
(j0,j1,...,jd−1)
)
( (m+1)κ
(j0+κ,j1,...,jd−1)
) − j0 + κ
κ
+ 1
= m ·
( mκ
(j0,j1,...,jd−1)
)
( (m+1)κ
(j0+κ,j1,...,jd1 )
) − j0
κ
= m ·
(mκ
j0
)
((m+1)κ
j0+κ
) − j0
κ
,
≤ 1(m+ 1)κ−1 by a similar argument, used in Eq. (25)
≤ 12κ−1
≤ 2
λlog
c−1(λ) since κ = (log(λ))
c, c > 1.
= negl(λ) since, c > 1.
Therefore, the largest eigenvalue of Π
H˜mκ
QΠ
H˜mκ
, which is attained by some
eigenvector in S˜ym
mκ
, is also negligible. Observe that, the term for the
eigenvalue of Π
H˜mκ
QΠ
H˜mκ
(which is the same as the loss of the verifier) is
very similar (up to a negligible factor) to the term for the expected utility in
Eq. (25) of the adversary in the proof of Proposition 13 on page 5. We did
not assume or require any computational assumptions on A, and therefore,
the scheme Pk-QC, is unconditionally nonadaptive-rationally-secure-against-
sabotage.14 
Proof of Theorem 29. Combining Propositions 13 and 28, we conclude that
Pk-QC is nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable (resp. unconditionally nonadaptive-
-rationally-unforgeable) (see Definitions 8 and 10) and hence nonadaptive-
rationally-secure (see Definition 27) (resp. unconditionally nonadaptive-rationally-
-secure) if the underlying Pr-QC scheme is nonadaptive-unforgeable (resp.
nonadaptive-unconditionally-unforgeable) (see Definition 9) such that Pr-QC.verify
is a rank-1 projective measurement. 
Proof of Corollary 30. Combining Theorem 29 with Theorems 14 and 15 we
get the respective results. 
14We do not even require any bound on m and n.
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Proof of Proposition 33. This follows trivially from the fact that the un-
traceable property holds for any quantum money scheme in which the verify
procedure used in Algorithm 4 is a rank-1 projective measurement. 
Proof of Theorem 11. Combining Propositions 12, 13, 28 and 33 with The-
orems 14 and 15, we get the result.
By Theorems 14 and 15, the private coin schemes constructed in [JLS18,
BS19] and [MS10] have a rank-1 projective measurement as the private
verification and are nonadaptive-unforgeable (or nonadaptive-unconditionally-
unforgeable). Hence, our construction Pk-QC instantiated with any of these
two schemes, will be nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable (or unconditionally
nonadaptive-rationally-unforgeable), nonadaptive-rationally-secure-against-sabotage
as well as private-untraceable by Propositions 13, 28 and 33 respectively.

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